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WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH TAXES ON INCOME
PREFACE
The expansion of the government's eoonoiaic activities and the
means of finanoing thein has given rise to a fiscal system which
tends, in a limited degree, to produce an automatic stabilizing
effect on the whole econony. It can hardly be claimed that auto¬
matic regulation was an important, or even a specific concern in
the formulation of the present revenue and expenditure system, but
any compensatory effects that happen to exist are nonetheless
important to a thorough understanding of the economy and the means
of controlling it*
It is the purpose of this study to examine built-in flexibility
in the light of the British tax system. Although a number of
investigations of this nature have been carried out in the United
States, almost no comparable empirical studies have been published
in this country* The work of earlier American investigators has
been drawn upon in the following chapters in an attempt to develop
a system of analysis appropriate to British circumstances and to
apply this system in order to uncover the pattern of movement and
impact of some of the most important automatic fiscal devices in the
British economy.
The study was undertaken in the belief that the development of
an adequate means of dealing with built-in controls, and at least a
first approximation toward the measurement of the contribution of
automatic stabilizers, would be a constructive contribution to the
understanding of the economy and the means of controlling its
perturbations.
The main contribution of the study is therefore an extension
of the theory of built-in stabilizers and, more particularly, an
empirical investigation of the sensitivity and effeot of the major
direct taxes. The measurement process incorporates coefficients of
spending behaviour, though it has not been the present purpose to
undertake an independent quantification of propensities.
Chapter I consists of introductory remarks concerning the
development of the stabilization function of governments and fiscal
controls in particular. This neoessarily involves a consideration
of the objectives of economic policy and the scope for the pursuit
of short-term economic policy through the budget. Chapter II is
devoted to a disoussion of the analytical considerations involved in
fiscal controls and the special implications of automatic devices.
This is followed in Chapter III by a fairly detailed examination of
the automatic devices in the British tax structure and the way in
which they can be expected to operate.
The first three ohapters are designed to introduce the problem
and outline the considerations involved in the theory and calculations
that follow in the second half of the study. Chapter IV is concerned
with the development of a theoretical framework which is employed
in the subsequent chapter to quantify the built-in flexibility and
stabilizing effect of the important direct taxes in Britain. This
is designed to throw light on the pattern of flexibility and its
impact under different forms of economic fluctuations. The final
chapter consists of a summary of the empirical observations and some
general comments on the limitations of the method.
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INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC STABILITY AND THE ROLE OF &QVERNMKNT
"It is certain that the world will not much
longer tolerate the unemployment which,
apart from brief intervals of excitement, is
associated - and in say opinion inevitably
associated - with present-day capitalistic
individualism* But it msy be possible by a
right analysis of the problem to cure the
disease whilst preserving efficiency and
freedom."
(John Msynard Keynes, the General Theory)
The maintenance of economic stability has become an important
concern of modern governments. Although some aspects of the potential
regulatory power of the state have been recognised for many years,
developments in the theory and practice of stabilization policies
have been particularly rapid during the last three decades. This
introductory chapter consists of a comment on the role of the state
in regulating the economy, its objectives, and the means at its dis¬
posal. The purpose of this outline is to frame the sucoeeding
theoretical and empirical discussion in its proper perspective. At
the same time, the context and scope of the subject matter to follow
can be suitably outlined.
1. The Development of Stabilization Controls
In most advanced countries of the western world a large share
of the national income is now channelled through the public sector.
The economic aetivily of the public sector is therefore bound to
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affect the economy as a whole, and hence it is important to con¬
sider the ways in which public economic activity can be made to
promote the government*s economic policy.
The recent history of the public sector in the United Kingdom,
as in many other countries, has been marked by a very substantial
increase in its economic importance not only in absolute terms but
also relative to the rest of the economy* A significant increase
in the size of the public seotor took plaoe around the turn of the
century, but the most important increases were associated with the
two world wars; after which temporary declines from exceptionally
high levels of taxation and expenditure were followed by a reversion,
starting from suooessively higher levels, to the long-term upward
trend. At present the oentral government and public enterprises
aooount for roughly one quarter of all economic activity/1^
War appears to have acted as a powerful catalyst in hastening
a process whioh might otherwise have been far more protracted.
However, there has been an underlying tendency for the state to
provide services over and above its traditional responsibilities
for defence and law and order. The responsibility for satisfying
an increasing range of wants, hitherto satisfied individually or
not at all, has been accepted by the state. To a large extent
this reflects a change in attitude toward the goals of economic and
soolal policy and the optimal balance between public and private
(1) In 1957 general government and public enterprises accounted for
22 per oent of gross national expenditure and 24 per cent of
factor income, occupied 25 per oent of the active population,
and gave rise to 42 per oent of all gross fixed investment.
See tiie United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, "The
Economic Significance of the Public Sector in some Western
European Economies", a study in Economic Survey of Europe In
1959. United Nations, Geneva, 19^0.
spheres of decision.
For convenience, the economic impact of the public sector can
be categorized under three heads: its influence on the allocation
of resources through providing for the satisfaction of collective
wants; the welfare implications of public activity, including the
distribution of income arising from the pattern of government tax¬
ation and expenditure; and the effects of public seotor operations
on roaoro-economio variables suoh as employment, production, and
prices.^ The present study is coneerned with the last of these
considerations, namely the influenoe of the public seotor on the
level of certain economic aggregates.
The growth in the economic importance of the publio seotor
has stimulated a theoretical and practical interest in the management
of public activities as a means of economic control. It is by no
means a recent discovery that the financial machinery of the state
•an be used to mitigate economic instability. For well over a
oentury it has been reasonably well established that the government
ooulfi exercise some control through regulating the supply of money.
In the simple classical model of the capitalistic economy, with wages
and prices flexible, and an implicit marginal spending propensity of
unity, adjustments in the money supply oould be shown to influenoe
(or stabilize) the level of prices. However, general economic
fluctuations in this context must take the form of temporary
disequilibria, and the flexibility of money wages ensures that the
system will always tend towards an equilibrium where the full
(2) Richard A. Musgrave has provided a oonvenient nomenclature for
these functions, namely the allocation branch, the distribution
branch, and the stabilization branch of the government budget.
The Theory of Public Finance. McGraw Hill Book Co. Inc.,
London, 1959, Chapter 1.
quantity of labour offered is employed at the appropriate level of
real wages. Since unemployment in this model is self-correcting,
the need for stabilizing output and employment does not arise.
Government taxation and expenditure changes have an effect only on
the price level, and only insofar as they influence the money
(3)
supply.N
The olassical model, however, incorporates assumptions which
have serious praotical implications. The development of maoro-
•conomic theory, which may be said to have originated in the work of
J.M. Keynes^, has paved the way towards an understanding of the
possibilities of influencing the level of economic activity through
adjustments in publio revenues and expenditures and particularly the
balance between the two sides of the government budget. Perhaps
the greatest contribution of the Keynesian model oonsists in
deiaonstrating that an equilibrium level of economic activity can be
reached without reference to the level of employment. Briefly,
equilibrium can exist whenever total spending just balances total
income, which implies a coincidence between planned saving and
planned investment. In this model, unlike the simple classical
ease, money can be either spent or saved, and in period of pessimism
adjustments in the money supply may have no direct effect because
of offsetting influences in the inducements to consume and invest.
*
(3) For a detailed discussion of the implications of the assumed
relationships in e conomic models for stabilization see Richard
A. Musgrave, op. pit.. pp. 407-411.
(4) Especially his The General Theory of Employment Interest and
Money, Maomillan and Co. Ltd., London, 193©.
Moreover, the supply of material output is assumed to he highly
elastic up to the point of full utilization of resources, so that
prices might be considered constant as long as unemployment prevails.
Stabilisation policy in this oase is directed at overcoming the
equilibrium of the system (if necessary) in order to shift the inter¬
section of the supply and demand schedules to a point at or near
the level at which full employment exists. Monetary measures will
be effeotive only as long as spending responds to changes in liquid¬
ity. Beyond this, however, the state oan directly or indirectly
influence the level of spending ly fiscal means, which involve
either encouraging or restricting private spending by operating on
private disposable income, or by changing the level of the public
share of total spending.
The great depression proved the Keynesian precept that eoonomio
decline could no longer be assumed to be merely a temporary
disequilibrium, and the helplessness of credit controls not only
emphasised as never before the need for more effeotive government
control over the eeonouy, but also predisposed public opinion to
aooept, if not demand, more state intervention.
But the emergence of fiscal policy was dependent, to some
extent at least, on the growth of the public sector, referred to
earlier. The increasing importance of the government budget not
only focused attention on the impact of taxation and public spending
during the late 1930'a and war years, but also provided the vehicle
which could carry an effeotive fisoal policy. Finally, the
tremendously increased availability of statistios during the war -
particularly the national inoome accounts after 1941 which were
designed to throw light on the problems of war finance and
inflationary pressure — provided the data essential for the formula¬
tion of compensatory oontrols by revealing imbalances in the
private sector.
"In 1941 with the celebrated budget of
Sir Kingsley Tbod a new technique of budget¬
ing was manifested. The financial budget
ceased to be regarded as a mere forecast of
the financial account of the Government and
became the annual blueprint for a mechanism
designed to preserve the balance of the
economy, with particular reference to the
war-time financial problem of inflation.
The structure of the budget for the
financial year was closely linked with the
calculations of the expected national
income and the official decisions regarding
its disposal. "(5)
Thus public finance, in addition to its traditional role of pro¬
viding publio facilities and services, and its rather more recent
function in redistributing income, has been given a third role,
that of promoting economic stability.
During the war and until 1951 monetary oontrols were virtually
abandoned and control depended upon fiscal measures and the
extensive use of direet oontrols. This period witnessed a tremend¬
ous growth in the understanding and use of the budget as a
regulating device; and developments in Britain were quickly taken
up in North America and elsewhere.
Since 1951 direct oontrols have largely been dispensed with,
and monetary and fiscal controls have both played their part in
(5) Idey, H.C. and Peaoock, A.T. National Income and Social
Accounting. Hutohinson*s University Library, London 1954,
p. 120.
(6) For a discussion of the development of the budget as the
oentre for economic control, see Samuel, H. Beer, Treasury
Controlt The Co-ordination of Finaneial and Economic Policy
in Great Britain, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, Chapter III.
stabilization policy. It is by no means a closed question, however,
how much reliance should be placed on monetary methods on the one
hand, and fiscal adjustments on the other. The advantages and
(7) .
limitations of the two are very different. Nevertheless, fiscal
policy, it can reasonably be assumed, will continue to be an
important means towards offsetting fluctuations. Even if one were
too timid to agree with Mrs. Hicks that fiscal policy must in
future be the senior partnerto oredit controls, it is safe to
draw the more cautious conclusion of the Committee on the forking of
the Monetary System.
"There will always therefore remain the question
how much reliance, in a given situation, should
be placed on monetary measures and how much on
these others; and governments may wish to change
their relative use from time to time. The
Earticular nature of a situation will of courseve an important bearing on the choice to be
made ...." (9)
Although monetary and fiscal policy are usually treated
separately, and this study restricts itself to the latter, it must
be borne in mind that the use of one form of oontrol vd.ll have
repercussions on the other. This is particularly important in
oonneotion with the monetary implications of budget surpluses or
deficits. Any budget, except one where oash outlays happen to
coincide with oash reeepts, will affect the money supply, and
(7) No attempt is made here to prove the superiority of either
fiscal or monetary methods of stabilization. A thorough dis¬
cussion of the problems associated with various forms of
monetary controls is to be found in the Report of the Committee
on the Working of the Monetary system. H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 827,
London, 1959 (henceforth Raacliffe"Report). The problems of
fiscal adjustments are discussed in the following chapter.
(8) Ursula K. Hicks, British Public Finances, their Structure and
Development 1880-1952. Oxford University Press, London, 195k,
p. 169.
(9) Radcliffe Report, op. oit., para. 66.
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government debt management will influence the claim structure. It
is therefore essential that fiscal measures he pursued in such a way
that their monetary repercussions do not frustrate, and preferably
complement, the objectives of fiscal policy. Thus, for example,
in depression, when fiscal policy requires a deficit and monetary
policy requires "easy" money, the deficit should be financed in
such a way as to contribute to the money supply, such as ty the
printing of new money or the sale of debt to the central bank
thereby increasing its reserves.
The post-war economic situation shows important differences
from pre-war conditions. Firstly, there has been rapid, and more
or less continuous economic growth. Secondly, unemployment has
stayed within relatively narrow margins and demand has never fallen
short of output by more than a few per cent. Finally, there has
been a persistent increase in price levels since the war. Post¬
war scarcities, pent-up demand, rising import prices, currency
devaluation, and the Korean War kept a heavy pressure on prices for
a number of years, and only recently have the possibilities for
price stability appeared more promising.
In this situation the role of stabilization policy is rather
different from that of the inter-war period, and hence from what was
envisaged in the early literature on compensatory finance. A
situation of large-scale unemployment has not arisen. The problem
has been to initiate quick marginal adjustments in demand to keep
the eoonony on the narrow path of full employment without price
inflation. This requires highly skilled direction, and calls for
highly delicate and flexible instruments of control.
Thus, although circumstances appear to have changed the nature
of the problem, for the time being at least, stabilization policies -
policies aimed at the maintenance of a high level of economic
aotivily without rapid price inflation - are not likely to become
leas important in the future. The scourge of involuntary
unemployment, the losses to all groups from fluctuating incomes and
prices, and the manifestation of a rival economic system that claims
to be immune to the perversity of business cycles, have given great
impetus to stabilisation programmes. It is hardly an exaggeration
to say that the national governments of all advanced oountries now
" ""
risibility of maintaining a high and stable level of
2. Fiscal Controls and Koonoaio Policy
Since budgetary adjustments represent only one of several
instruments of publio control, they must be coordinated with other
policies if a maximum contribution to economic policy as a whole
is to be achieved. Indeed, recent literature has laid increasing
emphasis on the necessity of dealing with the problems of public
(10) In Britain, "The Government is pledged to foster conditions in
which the nation oan, if it so wills, realise its full
potentialities for growth in terms of production and living
standards." The Economic Implications of Full Employment, a
Khite Paper presented to Parliament, If.M.3.0., Cad. 9725,
London, 1956, para. 25i in Canada, ".... the Government has
stated unequivocally its adoption of a high and stable level
of employment and income, and thereby higher standards of
living, as a major aim of Government policy," Employment and
Income, a White Paper presented to the Parliament or Canada,
H.M.C.S.O., 1945, P*23; and in the United States, ".... it is
the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means .... for the purpose
of creating and maintaining .... conditions under which there
will be afforded useful employment opportunities including
self-employment, for those able, willing and seeking to work,
and to promote maximum eaiployaent, production, and purchasing
power," preamble to the United States Employment Act of 1946.
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finanoe, and compensatory finance in particular, in the full context
of other economic objectives.
An understanding of the full effects of any particular measure
requires a knowledge of how the economy operates and the inter¬
relationships of the various parameters and variables. This
involves the nature of the economic "model" which is adopted for
purposes of analysis. The conception of the model, expressed
mathematically or merely implicit, governs the extent to which
different objectives are compatible, the means of achieving the
objectives in different oiroumstances, and the way in which the use
of a particular control in pursuit of a given objective will affeot
other objeotives.
However, given various possibilities within the framework of
the model, not all the methods of control can be considered accept¬
able. Some controls must be dismissed because they fall outside
the independent jurisdiction of the domestic authority, or because
the authorities are under an obligation not to exercise them. Such
is the case with exohange rate adjustments and import and export
controls. Other oontrols will be Inadmissible beoause of publio
opinion or the eonvietions of the prevailing political ideals. By
and large, most direct oontrols fall into this oategory. Finally,
certain measures may be impracticable beoause of institutional
circumstances which limit the authorities' freedom of control or the
speed with which changes oan be made. These institutional
considerations are discussed in Chapter II in connection with the
practical problems of fiscal policy.
The extent that given objectives can be reached depends,
therefore, not only on the particular nature of the economic structure
but also on the instruments of oontrol which are praotical and aooept-
able. If a number of measures oan be used the authorities have more
freedom of manoeuvre, and less drastic use of any particular oontrol
is required.
3* Objectives of Stabilisation Measures
The Keynesian principles were originally formulated with a view
to overcoming unemployment during periods of stagnation. They oan,
of course, be applied to the control of Inflation, as oan monetary
measures. Indeed the role of stabilisation policies is usually
taken to mean the maintenance of both price level stability and full
employment.
The desirability of full employment is readily appreciated.
That a substantial propsortion of people should not be subjected to
involuntary idleness is generally aooepted on sooial grounds alone.
Not only does unemployment mean that resources are idle and henoe the
usual objective of maintaining a maximum level of output is not being
fulfilled, but it oan also cause serious dislocations in the strueture'
of the economic system. Thus the health of the economy, as well
as the eoonomic security of individuals, requires that high
percentages of unemployment be prevented.
However, there is some ambiguity in the term unemployment. In
its oommon usage, unemployment refers to idle manpower, but it can
be applied to unused resources of other kinds or (particularly) to
idle preduotive capacity. Unemployment or underemployment of
other inputs or plant capacity cannot always be Identified with
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unemployed labour. Labour unemployment oan exist in the faoe of
high capacity utilization and vice versa. However, broad move¬
ments in the utilization of productive capacity can be expected to
be associated with roughly similar movements in labour employment.
Following well-established precedent, therefore, the term unemploy-
(11)
sent will be used here to refer to either idle capacity or labour.
The preoise point at which full employment exists, whether of
plant capacity or of manpower, is necessarily to some extent
indeterminate. Full use of oap&eity might be theoretically
defined as that point where short run marginal costs begin to
(12)
increase sharply above long run average oosts. Full manpower
employment can be oomparably defined as that level above which
additional labour is forthcoming only at a significantly higher
price. In any event, full employment of labour must refer to a
specified minimum of registered unemployment since there is at all
times a certain amount of "friotional" unemployment consisting of
people in transition from one job to another. This minimum oan be
decided only with reference to the structure of the economy, seasonal
faotors, the nature of the registration system, public opinion, and
other sooial circumstances (suoh as the prevalence of disguised
unemployment) in aiy particular oountry.
The arguments in support of price stability are equally
persuasive. A rising price level represents a tax on those rdth
(11) Divergences between manpower and capaoity employment involves
complicated technical as well as definitional problems which
cannot be entered into here. For a discussion of these
problems see Albert Sees, "The Measurement and Behaviour of
Unemployment". National Bureau of Economic Research, Nev. York,
1957.
(12) For a discussion of the problem of defining full employment,
see Albert Rees, ibid.
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relatively fixed incomes, who usually happen to include a
substantial proportion of persons with low incomes, and a correspond¬
ing subsidy to those whose incomes are flexible# On welfare
grounds, ary regressive redistribution of real inoonse is usually
considered undesirable. Furthermore, price instability makes
the measurement of value inconsistent through time. By affecting
investors' evaluations of expected returns and hence influencing
the direction and form of investment, unstable money value inter¬
feres with the regular growth of the economy.
There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which a ohange in
the value of money may be considered advantageous. Inflation can
prove useful in relieving the burden of a heavy national debt, in
creating an atmosphere of business optimism, in adjusting to foreign
exchange, or in accommodating money wage increases without sacrifice
to other factor shares. But unless the satisfaction of some such
particular need more than outweighs the advantages of a stable value
of money, price fluctations, because of their effeot on redistribution,
uncertainly and distortion, oan be taken as undesirable.
It should be noted, however, that the object of stabilisation
policy is not to prevent all fluctuations in the components of the
economy. Shifts in the direction of investment and consumption
spending are neoessazy and indeed inevitable in the process of
eoonomio growth and development. The purpose of stabilization is
therefore to mitigate or offset the effeot on total income and
expenditure of changes in particular components or sectors of the
eoonosy.
The twin objectives of prioe level stability and full employment
are by no means complementary. Far from the Keynesian assumption
14 -
that supply is perfectly elastio until the full employment level of
output is reaohed, speoifioity of resources and differences in the
rate of increase of demand for the products of different industries
result in a bidding up of costs and prices in some sectors of the
eeonoEy while unemployment may prevail in others. ! Particularly
in that seotor of the eoonoiqy characterised by strong unions and
large firms whioh have considerable control over prioes, wage demands
are often granted and covered by price increases even if some idle
capacity exists. In the concentrated industries these pressures on
prioes and wages react on each other to cause a general increase in
prioes. This prooess will tend to continue unless there is suffici¬
ent slack in the economy to resist these increases, but the effeotive
level of slackness may be considerable. Nevertheless, the desira¬
bility of both prioe stability and full employment is by no means
diminished by the extent of their incompatibility.
4* Scope of the Following Chapters
This conflict of objectives as full employment is approached
implies that stabilisation policy must aim at maintaining the highest
level of employment and inoomes consistent with reasonable prioe
stability. The discussion in the following chapters is therefore
(13) It may be noted that Keynes himself reoognised this; "Since
resources are not interchangeable, some commodities will reach
a oondition of inelastic supply whilst there are still
unemployed resources available for the production of other
commodities", and "Thus, instead of constant prices in
conditions of unemployment, and of prices rising in proportion
to the quantity of money in conditions of full employment, we
have in faot a oondition of prioes rising gradually as employ¬
ment increases." J.H. Keynes, op. oit.. p. 296.
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oonoemad with the primary objeotive of fisoal policy; the prevent¬
ion of fluctuations in the level of prices and incomes. For
simplicity, it is assumed that movements from one equilibrium level
of income to another does not involve any change in the general
prioe level, though this assumption olesrly requires reconsideration
in the context of the control of inflation.
Hearly all the ooaplioated aspects of economic growth are
omitted altogether from the analysis. This is justified on two
grounds. Firstly, economic growth has become virtually a
separate study and in the present context the theoretical equipment
is in a very undeveloped state. Secondly, the usefulness of
automatic!ty in fisoal adjustments is concentrated in the short run,
since over the long period changes in tire structure of the provisions
for taxation and expenditure, and discretionary adjustments within
existing provisions take on much greater importance. It should be
pointed out that, although automatic fisoal adjustments bear
r
interesting implications for economic growth, the measurement of
flexibility and its immediate impact is not affected by growth
oonsiderations.
In the following chapters, built-in flexibility is considered
as a weapon of fisoal policy, and special reference is made to the
forces which work through the public seotor in the United Kingdom.
Its contribution lies primarily in what is believed to be the first
empirical measurement of the quantitative impact of flexible devices
in the United Kingdom. In order to accomplish this, it is first
necessary to extend the theory which has been developed by previous
investigators and to devise a conceptual framework which will lend
16
Itself to the measurement of the speoific magnitudes to be analysed.
Most of the contributors to the theory of automatic oontrols,
who will be drawn upon in later chapters, have been American. The
predominance of literature from the United States probably reflects
the better opportunity in that country for empirical analysis in
this field. In addition to the greater availability of relevant
figures and statistics, the distaste for discretionary changes in
the United States has left the tax structure comparatively rigid,
which facilitates an examination through time of the extent to which
the tax system responds to income changes. In analysing the
British oase it has been necessary to adopt a method which circumvents
the necessity of comparing revenue levels between periods when
differences in yield result from differences in statutory provisions.
The method involves a discussion of fiscal controls which is
designed to show up the special implications of automatio devices,
and the problems associated with them, and is illustrated fcy an
examination of the built-in controls operating in the United Kingdom.
The empirical analysis follows upon the development of a theoretical
framework which predisposes an admitted bias towards a Keynesian
approach to economic analysis. Nevertheless, no attempt is made to
summarise or re-develop Keynesian theory in general. Those features
of m&oro-eoonoaio analysis which are necessary for the development
of the analysis are incorporated in the discussion as they are
required.
CHAPTER II
FISCAL CONTROLS AMD AUTOMTICITY
"It is obvious that a compensatory fiscal
policy becomes complicated not only because
several ends are to be realized simultaneously,
but also because careful timing of the various
measures seems to be necessary if the ends are
to be achieved at all." (Bent Hansen*)
The essence of fiscal control, as it has developed in the
context of maoro-eoonoaic theory, consists in off-setting broad
movements in the private seetor of the economy by throwing the
weight of government taxation and expenditure programmes in the
compensating direction. In principle, this procedure is simple
enough: when demand is insufficient or declining the state
attempts to encourage spending by increasing its own expenditures
and by leaving investors and oonsumers with more spendable income
through tax reduotions. Conversely, when demand is excessive
and prices threaten to rise, the state withdraws more spending
power and spends less Itself.
In practice, however, there are important difficulties
involved, and changes in government transactions are likely to
initiate adjustments throughout the ramifications of the econoqy.
These induced reactions may or may not be desirable. The effects
of fisoal adjustments other than on the stability of the econoay
are not of primary concern here and will be summarized only briefly.
* The Economic Theory of Fisoal Policy, p. 250.
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A review of fiscal repercussions is necessary, however, if only to
help plaoe fiscal policy in its full context, and to provide a basis
on which the full implications of automatic adjustments can be
demonstrated. This is the purpose of the present chapter.
Throughout this discussion it is important to bear in mind
that stabilization is only one of a number of objectives of the
public seotor. It can hardly be expeoted that the pursuit of stability
will never conflict with other aims of equal or greater importance,
and the reconciliation of these objectives must often involve a
compromise with stability. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the
government budget in the national economy ensures that even relative¬
ly small changes on either the revenue or expenditure sides will
have repercussions on a wide range of economic relationships. For
the time being the discussion will be confined to the practical,
difficulties of fiscal control, particularly the effeots likely to
be felt in the short run.
For eonvenienoe, these considerations are here divided into four
broad oategories, namely problems of recognition and analysis,
problems of implementation, problems of distortion, and some general
implications for economio growth. After an examination of these
problems for fisoal polioy generally, the special implications of
built-in mechanisms will be considered.
1. Problems of Recognition and Analysis
Fisoal control depends for its success first of all upon
recognition of the need for a particular degree and form of
corrective aotion. The corrective itself must be based on a
19
prediction of economic forces which in turn must be founded on an
analysis of current trends in various sectors of the economy and in
the economy as a whole. The precision of this analysis, finally,
depends upon the accuracy, timeliness and coverage of economic
statistics and other data available and the expertise of the
analysts.
The fundamental importance of an appropriate and effioient
informational system to provide the fiscal authority with the
material required for an accurate analysis of trends is therefore
obvious. Indeed, if the analysis proves incorrect or too late,
the action taken may well aggravate the situation it was designed
to eorreot.
The analysis and projection of economic trends is complicated
by the faot that there is no single satisfactory indicator of
movements in the economy as a whole, the relative importance of
different indicators varies, and nearly all information is by its
nature historical. The most generally accepted indicators of
economic trends are figures of employment, investment plans,
inventories, share prices and commodity markets. Besides these,
world trade, price movements, income statistics and planned state
expenditure warrant consideration in any forecast of the needs of
the econosy* Unfortunately, none of these indicators is infall¬
ible; and each one is susceptible to fluctuations which may reflect
trends in only a particular sector of the econosy or movements of a
vexy temporary or minor nature.
In spite of the importance of economic prediction, it would
appear that this is a field in which a good deal of work remains to
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be done.^**") Probably the only way to arrive at an accurate picture
of the economy is to make a careful analysis of the unfolding business
situation in as much detail and with as recent data as are avail¬
able. Nevertheless, a great deal of care is required in allocat¬
ing weights to the various indicators and in allowing for their
differing degrees of precision and timeliness. In addition,
the even more indeterminate but nonetheless important effects of the
(14) For a discussion of the problems involved in prediction, see
Geoffrey H. Moore, "The Diffusion of Business Cycles", in
Economics and toe Public Interest. (Robert A. Solow, Editor)
Rutgers University Press, 1955» PP* 35-64; and J.A. Estey,
Business Cycles; Their Nature Cause and Control. 3rd
edition, Prentioe-Kall &oonoaio Series, New York, 1947,
Chapter 19* Some of the implications of imperfect information
are dealt with by Bent Hansen, The Economic Theory of Fisocl
Policy (translated from the Swedish), George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, Chapter XIX.
The seriousness of inadequate information has been
underlined by the Organization for European Economic
Co-operation:
"Prompt and adequate policy measures in the past
have been hampered to some extent by lack of
sufficient current information on economic
developments. Improvements in siort-term
economic indicators need to be pre:noted."
Policies for Sound Economic Growth. Ter, -!i Annual Review,
O.E.iS.C., Paris, March 1959, para, (xii); and again,
"We were struck by the fact that i or many countries
there remain major gaps and serious delays in the
information that the authorities should nave
as a guide to prompt and adequate policy decisions.
This is the case with straight statistical data
.... (but) .... even more the case with
analytical studies ....*
William Fellner, Milton Gilbert, Bent Hansen, Richard Kahn,
Frisdrich Luts, Pieter de Wolff, The Problem of Blsing Prices.
O.E.E.C., Paris, Mey, 1961, p. 39-
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economic and political situation in other countries and political
policies at home must be accounted for.
Moreover, it is necessary to predict not only the direction but
also the momentum of a trend, since a potentially major swing will
require oorreotives which differ in form as well as strength from
those suitable for minor fluctuations* Indeed, movements may
oocur whioh are in fact false alarms, and these must, if fluctuations
C15)
are not be created, be distinguished from real trends. '
The distinction between trends in particular seotors of the
eoonomy and movements in the econony as a whole is espeoially
relevant in this oonneotion* A decline in agriculture, for example,
may have nothing in common with the rest of the econony but may
reflect forces which affect this seotor alone, such as a decline in
the price of food imports, adverse weather, or reduced agricultural
subsidies. Independent movements in the rate of housing construct¬
ion and industries suoh as ooal production provide other appropriate
examples.
These structural problems complicate the analysis of the
eoonomic situation.Moreover, they point up the limitations of
(15) For a thorough examination of these analytical problems, see
William Fellner, Trends and Qyoles in Economic Activity, Henry
Holt and Compapy, New York, 1956*
(16) The concern his problem causes in all countries is aptly
exemplified in the following statement by the Deputy Minister
of Trade and Commerce for Canada (Mr Jams A» Roberts):
"Here at hose, in 1961, we face a most baffling paradox.
At a time when our national production and income, our
exports, our standard of living, our personal incomes
and our employment are at or near record levels - in
(cont'd p. 22)
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aggregative economic models, and suggest correctives of a speoifio
rather than a general nature. Indeed, the usefulness of speoifio
measures may have beoome overshadowed by the reoent tendency to
analyse the economy in terms of a few broad aggregates.Such
speoifio controls which are already exercised over agriculture and
state oontrolled industry may be appropriate for other sectors as
well. However, state interference with specific sectors, in
addition to its political implications, gives rise to the danger of
(16) (cont'd)
other words, while we are enjoying general
prosperity, we have unemployment and distress
in a number of our •••• industries."
Reported in the Canadian Wookly Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 12,
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Maroh 22nd, 1961,
p. 6. Conversely:
"Even though there may net be exoessive general
pressure on resourees, such strains (in particular
sectors) - which arose in the last boom in several
oountries, for example in coal, building, or certain
steel products - oan have inflationary effects over
broad areas of the economy."
Policies for Sound E00nomic Growth, op. pit., para. (viii).
(17) R.A. Gordon, for example, writes "Recent theoretical models
have been of much too simple a form * too few variables and
equations, too simple a system of lags, and too much depend¬
ence on unchanging relationships to reproduce the wide
diversity of cyclioal experience that we find in practice."
"Types of Depression and Programs to Combat them", in
Policies to Combat Depression. A Conference of the Univer¬
sities - National Bureau Committee for Economic Research,
Princeton University Press, 1956, (henoeforth Policies to
Combat Depression) pp. 7-22. E.E. Hagen takes a highly
sceptical view of the possibility of preoise prediction, and
oonoludes: " •••• it may be asserted that error in forecast¬
ing is too great to permit its use as a basis for timing
ohanges in publio policy." "Problems of Timing and Administer¬
ing Pisoal Policy in Prosperity and Depression", American
Soonomio Review. Vol. 38, May, 1948, pp. 4-17-429. Hagen
points to automatic stabilisers as the alternative to
adjustments based on forecasts.
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oonfliet with other seotors and. with the trend of the economy as
a whole.
Finally, faced with a fluctuation, the analysis must be capable
of distinguishing between a seoular and a self-oorreoting trend.
This is because the appropriate corrective will depend to a
considerable degree upon whether the problem is one of a general
static equilibrium, either below the full employment level
(stagnation) or with constant inflationary pressure, or one of
(19)
moderating the swings in a dynamic cyole. ' An effort to
moderate the amplitude of dynamic, or cyclical fluctuations would
consist in oorreoting or off-setting the perverse movements of
investment and consumption in the private sector by such readily
flexible means as monetary and interest rate adjustments, flexible
works programmes, or short-term revenue oh&nges. These must be
carefully timed and of appropriate intensity if the danger of
aggravating the oyole is to be avoided.
A situation of static equilibrium either above or below the
full employment level is in the nature of a structural problem. In
this ease, the solution involves shifting the point of equilibrium
or the level of aotivity around which the cycles fluctuate. If the
level of investment should deoline, for example, without any off¬
setting increase in consumption, a stagnant condition of
(18) This problem will be referred to again later in connection
with fiscal effects on the optimum level of public services,
infra p. 52.
(19) This reflects what K.E. Boulding refers to as * static
preoarlousness* on the one hand, and 'dynamic precariousnoss'
on the other. See his "Structure and Stability; The
Economics of the Next Adjustment" in Policies to Combat
Depression, pp. 59-74.
24 -
under—employment and undero&paoity equilibrium as in the Keynesian
ease will result. This situation requires measures designed to
disturb the spending and saving sohedules of the private sector or
direot adjustments in public spending ("pump printing") in order to
initiate a shift toward the desired equilibrium.
It is therefore important to distinguish between cyclical and
structural problems, but it would be wrong to suggest that they are
not to some extent interdependent. An induoed change in invest¬
ment, by affecting productive capacity, alters the full employment
level of output and henoe itself imposes a requirement of increased
or decreased consumption. Again, correctives of this kind may well
induoe temporary movements past the optimum which will beoome the
first phase of a dynamic cyole. This underlines the importance
of recognising the extent of the temporary swing, so that the
corrective is neither inadequate nor sufficient to magnify the
tynamic instability.
One authority has aptly summarized the problem of economic
prognostication as follows:
"To forecast how the economy will move if the
government does nothing is at all times a
pertinent undertaking, but never more so than when
it spurs the government into needed activity.
Then come the questions not only of what kind of
aotion and how much, but also at what dates.
To one who has had some small experience of the
time taken to get a policy across, the time
taken to put it in train and the time taken for
it to come to full fruition, a form of enquiry
which starts by noting such differences between
the potential and actual effects of a policy
seoms to have some realism. Moreover, it
is one problem to keep an eoonony on the rails;
it is a different and harder problem to get an
eoonoay baok on to the rails after it has left
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them. An analytical apparatus which can distinguish
between the accumulated past error, the current error
and the rate of ohange in error, can certainly aid
our thinking even if it does not pretend to solve all
our difficulties." (20)
2. Problems of Implementation
Quite apart from the ability of the information system to
analyse and project current trends, lies the problem of initiating
timely and effective corrective measures. The difficulty faoing the
fisoal authority in this oonneetion consists firstly in the inflexi¬
bility in both the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget, and
seoondly, even if the required adjustments can be made, in the loss
of time in bringing them about. For convenience these rigidities
oan be classified as 'programme inflexibility' and 'time inflexi¬
bility'.
Programme inflexibility
Programme inflexibility refers to the faet that a good deal of
public spending and revenue cannot be readily altered for stabilizat¬
ion purposes. Again, the other objectives of public aotivity cannot
always be subordinated to stability. But even apart from these
(20) R.C. Tress, "The Contribution of Economic Theory to Economic
Prognostication", Eoonomica. Vol. XXVT, No. 103, August, 1959,
pp. 194-211. The same author offers the relevant word of
warning: " .... I suggest the prognostication will lose muoh
its value - it might even beoome misleading - unless it can
raise its sights fully to the range of a fluctuation problem."
Loc. pit. For a pessimistio view of precision in forecast¬
ing, see Milton Friedman, "A Monetary and Fisoal Framework
for Eoonomic Stability," American Koonomic Review, Vol. XXXVIII,
June 1948, pp. 245-264; reprinted in his Essays in Positive
Economics. University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 133-156.
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considerations, the very nature of public functions lead to
rigidities that make them alterable in the short run only with
considerable dislocation and loss in efficiency*
In periods of excess demand when a contractionary policy is
oalled for, it is not a simple matter to increase taxes quiokly.
Even apart from the problem of time lags, an increase in tax-revenues
encounters more public resistance than a decrease, and may involve
the necessity of establishing new administrative machinery. Lower¬
ing tax rates as an expansionary measure may well cause an exoess
demand problem after the situation has been corrected but reinstate¬
ment of the higher rates is resisted. The struotural impediments
to tax adjustments are admittedly largely political, but they are
(21}
nonetheless considerable. '
A good deal more programme inflexibility is to be expected with
short run adjustments on the expenditure side of the budget. Public
investment spending, in partioular, is not tractable in the short-
term, in spite of the dominant plaoe it was given in the early
(??)
literature on fisoal control.v ' Indeed, two government White
Papers reflect an almost oomplete reversal in official attitude
toward manipulating investment in the interests of stability, In
1944 it was considered that:
(21) The postwar experience of a number of countries in the use of
tax adjustments for oounter-cyolical purpose is summarized by
Angus Maddison, "The Postwar Business Cycle in Western Europe
and the Role of Government Policy", Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 53* June i960, pp. 99-148. See
also The Economic Commission for Europe, op. oit.
{22) This was no doubt because the early literature on the subject,
following Keynes, was oonoerned primarily with the correction
of undesirable static equilibria rather than of short-term
dynamic movements. The inappropriateness of investment
changes for this latter purpose was not, however, immediately
recognised.
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"Public investment can •••« be used more direotly
as an instrument of employment policy «... . For
the purpose of maintaining general employment it is
desirable that public investment should actually
expand when private investment is declining and
should contract in periods of boom." (23)
Ety 196O, however, the government recognized the problems assoc¬
iated with, and henoe the undesirability of suoh short-term alterat¬
ions in publio investment.
"The of expansion with stability conditions
the pace of those of the programs which are
designed to meet basic economic requirements and
so the bulk of the work on them cannot lightly be
deferred or advanced. Other programs are concerned
with important social needs; these, too, as the
1944 White Paper itself pointed out, cannot readily
be postponed though there is, on occasion,
opportunity to aoeelerate or retard them marginally
when the general level of demand requires.
Finally, onoe work has begun on a project, it is
usually uneconomic to attempt either to
aocelerate or to retard it at short notice. There
is, therefore, a large proportion of publio
investment where it would not be sensible to try
to engineer short-term variations in momentum to
match changes in eoonomio oiroumstanoes as rapid or
as relatively mild as those experienced in reoent
years.
.... With these considerations in mind, the
Government seek as far as possible to avoid
interference with investment plans which have been
approved." (24)
The above referenoe to "a large proportion" of publio investment
suggests the possibility that some fraction of this form of outlay
may be manipulablej and that marginal adjustments in the rate of
(23) Employment Polity. 4 White Paper presented to Parliament,
H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6527# London, 1944 (reprinted 1956).
(24) Publio Investment in Great Britain. A White Paper presented to
Parliament, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 1203, London, November 1960,
para. 9 and 10.
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spending can be made in other cases. Nevertheless, in view of the
high capital intensity of most government investment undertakings,
there are probably few projects which, beoause of technical
considerations alone, oan be undertaken, terminated, speeded up or
retarded without increase in oost or waste of resources. Mapy of
the difficulties associated with adjusting public investment spend-
(25)
ing are encountered in the control of private investment as well.
Governments oan make a substantial contribution to economic
stability# however, by managing capital expenditure programmes in
suoh a way that the public investment spending proceeds in a steady
fashion. This is particularly important when public investment is
(26)
a large proportion of total capital formation in the eoonony. J A
basio problem in this connection lies in the faot that public
investment plans, in Britain at least (in contrast, for example, with
Franoe, with its Commissariat General du Plan), are, at best, only
loosely co-ordinated.
The extent to which government consumption spending can be
stemmed or expanded in response to short-term fiscal requirements
depends upon the pattern of expenditure. Most of the largest items
are likely to prove difficult to adjust at short notioe. Defence
spending, which comprises a large share of current expenditure, is
liable to considerable fluctuation; but these fluctuations are the
(25) See Angus Maddison, op. cit.
(26) In 1959, the public sector, including local authorities and
publio corporations, accounted for 43*0 per cent of United
Kingdom gross fixed capital formation. Central Statistical
Office, National Income and Expenditure 1960. H.M.S.O.,
London, August, 1960 (henceforth National Income and Expend¬
iture I960), Table 48.
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result of external or political factors which show, at best, only
random correlation to current fisoal needs. Interest on publio
debt oannot be adjusted at short notice, nor, for sooial and
political reasons, can expenditures on administration, health, and
(27)
other welfare services^ . Local authority grants arc usually
determined in advanoe by two or three years. Mary other services
(transport, broadousting, education, etc.) hardly lend themselves to
the kind of adjustments required by effective fiscal policy.
Thus, on purely a priori grounds, it would appear that publio
expenditures offer rather less opportunity for counter-cyclical
adjustments than do revenues and transfers. Moreover, with reference
to publio expenditures in general, it is worth repeating that any
adjustments on compensatoiy grounds alone run the risk of interfering
with the optimum balance between the public and private sectors.
Time inflexibility
Time inflexibility refers to the difficulty, even when the
structural problems of fisoal adjustment can be overcome, in bringing
the changes into effect quickly enough to ensure the desired effect.
Clearly, these two forms of inflexibility are not unrelated.
Programme inflexibility can usually be overcome if enough time is
(27) In fact, debt interest payments may well tend to show a per¬
verse movement. Insofar as the government causes interest
rates to rise either directly or by increased borrowing as part
of a deflationary policy, the government's interest obligations,
on new issues at least, may well tend to increase.
(28) The possibility of varying public consumption expenditure for
fisoal purposes and the difficulties involved are discussed in
the vThite Paper on Employment Policy, op. olt., para. 73*
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available, and the onuses of time delay are often the result of
structural rigidities. Nevertheless, it is convenient to deal with
the timing problem separately.
Prompt implementation of the prescribed fiscal correctives is
imperative if the objective is to "nip in the bud" potential adverse
trends rather than oorrect an unfavourable situation only after it
has ooourred. More important, tardy or untimely action (or the
effeots of aetion taken) may well make a situation worse than if no
aotion was taken at all. There is no question that timing is of
critical importance in fiscal control, but it is especially critical
when that control is directed toward dynamic or cyclical fluctuations.
However, in view of the informational difficulties outlined
earlier, time will usually be lost, to begin with, in recognising the
need for aetion and in formulating an appropriate reoipe for correct¬
ion. In reoent years the availability of detailed and up-to-date
economic statistics has improved tremendously, but an information lag
of only a month can be serious.Time consumed in analysis,
(29) The 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy, op. oit.. para. 80 to
86, recognised the serious need for more and better information.
"It is therefore vital for them (the Government) to
obtain more fully and much more quickly than they
have in the past, exact quantitative information
about current economic movements. Without this,
informed control would be impossible and the central
staff, which it is proposed to set up, would be left
to grope and flounder in uncertainty."
Since that time there have been a number of developments, includ¬
ing, for example, the preparation by the Central Statistical
Office, in collaboration with the Statistics Divisions of the
government departments, a Monthly Digest of Statistios (H.M.S.O.)
providing statistios of inoome, employment, production, finance,
etc. in arrears of less than three months in most oases, and
Eoonomio Trends, which gives quarterly estimates of the main
components of national inoome and expenditure together with a
commentary.
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given the appropriate data, is largely a function of the expertise
and sis# of the staff employed for that purpose. This lag, in
faot, could be negative if forecasting was perfect. The time that
might be lost in formulating a corrective policy suggests that
plans to meet future possible contingencies should, as far as possible,
be laid well in advance. Such forward planning will, of course,
be more difficult for the solution of specific structural problems
than for dealing with general swings in the economy as a whole.
Onoe the analysis and plan for correction is complete, more
time will be lost in meeting political requirements regarding
legislative approval for fiscal changes* This requirement varies
for the form of change envisaged.v ' The level of authorisation
ranges from a departmental head in a local authority to full
legislative consent, and the time lag involved will probably be
roughly in proportion to the level of approval required.
Following Prest, the above time losses might be referred to
as the 'recognition lag' and the •administrative lag' respectively.
There will also be an 'operational lag' involved in initiating the
programme of regulation which will have to be preceded by organisat¬
ion of the machinery through which action is to be taken.
(30) For an analysis of the oontrol of public expenditures, see
Ursula K* Hicks, Public Finance. Cambridge University Press,
reprinted 1958, Part I.
(31) A.R. Prest, Public Finanoe in Theory and Praotioe. Weidenfeld
and Nioholson, London, 1960, p. 97*
(34) In this ooxmeotion, adjustments on the revenue side have an
obvious advantage since, once approved, changes in rates,
allowances, etc., of either sales or income taxes can be put
into effeot relatively quiokly and without new administrative
machinery.
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Finally, there will almost inevitably be a lag between the initiation
of the programme and the fruition of results.
In summary, changes in revenue and expenditure programmes will
be time-consuming to an extent dependent upon the political require¬
ments for approval of fisoal changes, the administrative difficulties
involved in accommodating the change, and the speed with which the
iapaot of the change makes itself felt.
"In view of the number and variety of bodies
immediately eonoemed .... and the impracticability
in most oases of varying the rate of work on
projects already in progress, a decision to
stimulate or restrain the rate of expenditure
must be made in good time if it is to have a
eounter-cyolioal effeot. It may be six months
until significant results begin to become
apparent and the full effect may not make its
impact until a year after that." (33)
The problems of inflexibility are, to a considerable extent,
the result of institutional factors. In Britain economic policy
as reflected in the fisoal system is the responsibility of the
Chsnoellor of the Exchequer who presents his annual budget in
April, at the beginning of the financial year, and receives final
assent to his revenue and expenditure measures in subsequent
legislation. The Chancellor, in drawing up hi 3 budget, relates
the requests for funds from individual Ministries to the general
economic situation. In this regard he relies on the advioe of
the Treasury, and particularly on the economic section of the
Treasury which is lead by the Economic Adviser to H.M. Government.
(33) Public Investment in Great Britain, op. clt.. para. 10.
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The annual budget imposes a considerable rigidity on economic
policy. It is only rarely, and then with politioal difficulty,
that the Finance Act oan be amended during the financial year. This
advance programming, though of unquestionable value for the
efficient execution of government operations, places a serious
restriction on fiscal oontrol. Moreover, the traditional formulat¬
ion of the budget, in the United Kingdom at least, dees not
facilitate an understanding of its economic Impaot or the way in
C 3L)
which adjustments might be made for fiscal purposes. '
(34-) For these reasons, Angus Maddison suggests "It would be
helpful if budgets could be rearranged to show more dearly
the impaot of public finance on the eoonony, and this in
turn would make it easier to vary taxes in the course of
the year rather than waiting for a fixed budget day which
may not be optimal for policy changes, and whieh often
provokes adverse speculative movements." op. pit.. p. 147«
In the United Kingdom the division of the budget into
"above the line" and "below the line" has gradually come
olose to a current and a capital aooount. In general,
those items financed by borrowing are put "below the line"
though this is not necessarily the oase. In practice
many "capital" items, such as trunk roads and hospitals,
are put "above the line" and set against ourrent revenue;
while oertain current items such as the accumulated
operating deficits of British Railways are placed "below
the line". An alternative budget presentation distinguish¬
ing ourrent and capital transactions was introduoed by
the Chanoellor of the Exchequer in 1948 and was used in
addition to the traditional layout until 1955, when it was
abandoned. The problems associated with implementing
fiscal policy through the American federal budget are
discussed by Gerhard Colm, "Fisoal Policy and the Federal
Budget", in Income Stabilization for a Developing Democracy.




Directly related to the problem of timing is the possibility*
already referred to, that fiscal measures ma; aggravate rather than
alleviate an adverse trend. This possibility places a particularly
important limitation on the usefulness of comparative static
models for the analysis of fisoal policy. la addition to their
(usual) incapability of accommodating changes in prices and interest
rates, they fail to show the pattern of change through time.
Certain policies can introduce instability or magnify adverse
behaviour even though the final equilibrium as shown by a static
analysis is satisfactory.
These perverse effects are caused by the interaction of
imprecise timing and incorrect strength of corrective action. It
has been demonstrated that oertain types of policy not only cause
cyclical fluctuations, but any attempt to speed up the process of
correction by adopting a stronger policy is likely to do more harm
than good by increasing the violence of the cyclical movement.
This danger becomes particularly evident when the time lag involved
In the correction is long.
It has been estimated elsewhere that in order to reduce the
varianoe of income fluctuations by one half (or reduce the standard
(35) See the two studies by A.H. Phillips; "Stabilisation Policy
in a Closed Economy", The Economic Journal. Vol. LXIV, June
1954* pp. 290-323» in which he examines the effects of
lagged responses of an exponential form, and, "Stabilisation
Policy and the Time-Form of Lagged Responses", The Economic
Journal. Vol. LCVII, June 1957* pp. 265-277* whioh consists
of a comparison of the effcots of lags of differing time-
forms*
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deviation "by one third) the correlation coefficient between the
oocurrence of income fluctuations and the ticing of corrective
adjustments must exceed 0.7 even if the corr*otive is of precisely
the right magnitude.The possibility of time lags already
referred to suggests that this degree of corrilation would be
difficult to achieve.
w
•••• our ignorance about lags and about the
fundamental causes of business fluctuation
prevents complete oonfidenoe •••• • The
lag between the oreation of a government deficit
and its effects on the behaviour of oonsumers
and producers could conceivably be so long and
variable that the stimulating effects of the
deficit were often operative only after other
faotors had already brought about a recovery
rather than when the initial decline was in
progress. Despite intuitive feelings to
the contrary, I do not believe we know
enough to rule out completely this possibility.
If it were realised, the proposed framework
could intensify rather than mitigate cyclical
fluctuations; that is, long and variable
lags could convert the fluctuations in the
government contribution to the income stream
into the equivalent of an additional random
disturbance." (37)
Finally, any consideration of the problem of income correction
in dynamic terms must be concerned not only with the degree of
correction or offset but also with the speed of reaction and the
path of adjustment. There may be a choice, for example, between
one corrective which will bring the level of income smoothly
and gradually baok to the desired equilibrium and another which
(36) Milton Friedman, "The Effeots of a Full-Baployment Policy on
Eoonoiaio Stability: A Formal Analysis" in his Essays in
Positive Economis. op. pit., pp. 117-132.
(37) Milton Friedman, "A Monetary of Fiscal Framework for Eoonomio
Stability", op. pit.. p. 144.
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will achieve this final result more quickly but also more violently,
perhaps involving unfavourable distributional effects# The faster
oorreotion may also tend to aggravate the dislocations resulting
from cyclical behaviour. There is no simple choice among the
various oomplex alternatives that may be available, each having a
different time path and speed of reaction. Such choices depend
largely on individual tastes and preferences.
It may therefore be concluded that far from the frequent
assumption that almost any notion is better than none, measures
of inappropriate form, magnitude, or timing run a strong risk of
increasing rather than off-setting fluctuations and their undesir¬
able effects.
3. Problems of Distortion
In addition to the technical and political problems outlined
above concerning the recognition of the need for fiscal controls
and their formulation and imposition, adjustments in the public
sector have wider implications for the eoonony as a whole whioh must
be recognised. Because stability is only one of a number of
objectives of public finance, its pursuit must be viewed in the full
light of any disturbances that may result to the other budgetary
objectives and to the private sector. These disturbances, which
vary for different fisoal measures, are the result of induced
alterations in the scope of public activity, the distributional
impact of changes in taxes and benefits, distortions in the balance
between alternative costs and prices, and the oreation of illusions
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of various kinds. Such effeots are virtually inevitable and their
manifestation involves the whole subject of "neutrality" of
compensatory finance. This is not the plaee to examine the problem
of neutrality in any detail, but a review of the considerations
involved is a necessary Inclusion in any discussion of the
implications of fiscal adjustments.
The impact of alternative adjustments
Fisoal controls are by definition designed to influence the
level of economic aotivity, though some measures have a more potent
impact than others. For convenience in discussing the impact of
different policies, fisoal adjustments ©an be grouped into three
broad categories. Firstly, it will be convenient to deal with
the adjustment of publio expenditures, assuming that revenues remain
unchanged. Conversely, publio expenditures may be assumed oonstant,
138}
while revenues are altered. ' Finally, both revenues and expend¬
itures can be considered to be adjusted equally in the same
direction. These three categories will be referred to as
expenditure adjustments, revenue adjustments, and balanced adjustments
respectively. For the time being, the effects of fisoal measures
(39}
©n liquidity and the structure of olaims will be ignored.
Spending adjustments (revenues remaining fixed) can be expeoted
(38) This proposition immediately begs the question as to whether
expenditures are to be maintained in real or in money terms.
For a discussion of this question, see Richard A. Musgrave,
op. oit.. pp. 211-213*
(39) This espeot of fisoal policy is examined in detail by Richard
A. Musgrave, op. oit.. Chapter 22.
to have the greatest impact on the eoonocy as a whole. Any increase
in government spending on goods and services or on investment will
increase aggregate expenditure not on3y by the amount of the publio
outlay but also by the rounds of re-spending initiated (through the
"multiplier" prooess) by the increased expenditure. Apart from
any effects on inoentives and income distribution, there will be no
off-setting reduotion in private spending sinoe tax revenues are
left unohanged. In praotioe, however, private spending may be
reduced if the new publio aotivity competes with private enterprise,
if the deficit spending oreates a suspicion of economic insecurity,
or if the necessary inorease in public debt raises interest rates
enough to discourage private borrowing.
Revenue reduction will have only an indirect effect on the
level of demand through increasing private disposable incomes, and
(providing the marginal propensity to consume is positive) thereby
increasing private spending. A reduotion of taxes will affect
total spending less than an equal expansion of government spending
because in the former oase the "multiplier" will be less by one.
Thus if 1 mpo 0, then spending expansion ( &) will inorease
total inoorae (Y) by an amount equal to the value of the multiplier
(k) multiplied by the inorease in publio spending:
i.e.: Y = k G
An equal money reduotion in tax revenues ( T) will have an
impact whioh will be less by an amount equal to the amount of the
tax reduotion:
i.e.: Y a (k-1) T
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Thus, if T = G, the effeot on Y in the former oase is
greater by the amount of G ( or T).
Balanced adjustments will have still less impact on the level
of total spending since the increase in public expenditures will be
off-set to some extent by the equal reduction in private disposable
incomes* The increase in total expenditure will result from the
public spending of funds which, if left in private hands, would be
partially saved. Using the earlier notations, the effeot of
a balanced increase can be summarised as the difference between
the inorease oaused by the public outlay and the decrease resulting
from the higher taxes.
Y ■ k A G - (k - 1) / T
Butt G = T, so
Y - k A & - (k - 1) * &
= A &
The net inorease in income is thus equal only to the amount of
the original increase in public spending.
If the increase in government outlay was not on goods and
services, but took the form of an expansion of inoome transfers, the
impact would be considerably reduoed. In ;„his ease (as in the case
of revenue reduction), the stimulus would be entirely indirect since
the direct impact of the outlay on spending would be eliminated;
i.e.: Y = (k-l)iS
(4CA This important consideration is sometimes overlooked; for
example, Clarenoe Heer, in his "Stabilising State and Looal
Pinanoe", in Policies to Combat Depression, p. 178, suggests
that in the oase of taxes being raised to finanoe an
equivalent expansion of expenditures * .... the effect of a
tax increase on aggregate demand is apparently neutral."
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As a result, In the balanced expansion case, the net effeot
would be eliminated altogether, sinoe:




Thus, in the short run, and under the simplifying assumptions
referred to earlier, spending adjustments will have the greatest
(41)
effeot and balanced adjustments the least.
For revenue ohanges, the Impaot on spending of alternative tax
adjustments involves the problem referred to by Kaldor as the
"eoonomio efficiency" of tax measures.Tax efficiency refers
to the expenditure-restraining effeots of taxes; the more a tax
is paid out of potential savings, the less restraint it imposes on
spending, and henoe the lower its efficiency. Thus, given two tax
alternatives of differing efficiencies, one will have to withdraw
greater money revenue than the other in order to produce the same
restriction of domand. If the object of the tax is to release
resouroes, it is ty no means a matter of indifference which alternative
is chosen. Clearly, as long as the marginal utility of money is
(41) These are admittedly highly simplified representations and are
meant for illustrative comparison only. Mueh more elaborate
results are obtained if various forms of taxation and transfers,
and their differing multipliers, are oonsidered. For more
complicated analyses see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of
Public Finanoe. op. oit., Part Four.
(42) Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax. George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., London, pp. 173*"175»
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positive, the tax which reduoes consumer's income or wealth the
least will he preferable.Since either tax would, by definit¬
ion, have the same effeot on demand and prices, the higher money
balances remaining after the more efficient tax, represent higher
real balances as well.^*^
Regardless of the form of corrective measure, the inevitable
confliot between the objectives of full use cf resouroes and stable
prioes i3 encountered as full employment is approaohed. Because
of the rigidities referred to in the first ohapter, fiscal policy
in inflationary cireumstanoes can suooeed in stabilizing prioes
only if demand is reduoed enough to cause output to fall below the
full capabilities of productive oapaoity. The pursuit of stable
prices therefore loses rauoh of its appeal when it begins to adversely
affect the level of employment.
Although the degree of slaok required to prevent pressure on
prices may not be so great as to leave a very large total unemployment
level, the unemployment is not likely to be evenly distributed.
Contractionary fisoal policy is likely to press particularly heavily
on those industries for which demand is stable or deolining and such
an effeot will be especially important if these industries are
(43) For the same reasons, if the purposes of an excise tax is to
release speoific resouroes, it will have greater efficiency
(beoause it will have both inoome and substitution effeots)
than a "non-discriminatory" tax heavy enough to give the same
result.
(44) See A. Morag, "Is the 'Economic Efficiency' of Taxation
Important?", The ioonomio Journal. Vol. LXIX, March 1959,
pp. 87-94.
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regionally distributed. In such oases the frequent argument that
the neutrality of fiscal controls makes them preferable to monetary-
measures is to some extent weakened. Regional unemployment, for
example, suggests a need for a rather different form of oorreotive,
such as regionally specific public works or inducements to private
activity.
Finally, it should be emphasized that even if fisoal policy
oonoentrates on consumption rather than investment expenditure,
this does not mean that the rate of economic growth is unaffected.
Net investment results largely from the prospect of sales expansion
in the faoe of pressure on existing capacity. If fiscal policy
suoceeds in reducing demand to the extent of removing this pressure,
the induoement to invest will be removed. Lower investment will,
of oourse, reinforce the initial fisoal measures. But if the
desired rate of investment is that which is associated with full
eapaoity employment, this means that price stability can be achieved
only at the prioe of slower eoonomio growth.
Income redistribution
The distributional effeots of fisoal adjustments present an
exceedingly difficult challenge for economic analysis. The basic
problem lies in defining a basis on whioh the effect of a particular
budget change oan be demonstrated. For laok of a better method, the
problem oan be approached by assuming that the imposition of ary
given fisoal measure is aooompanied by an equal but opposite ohange
in some other hypothetical measure whioh Is distributionally neutral.
Suoh a method is far from ideal, sinoe it is unlikely that there is
apy suoh thing as a distributionally neutral fisoal adjustment. In
faot, the present size and distribution of income is itself clearly
influenced by distrlbutionally biased budget policies in the past.
Nevertheless, this procedure provides a useful means of demonstrat¬
ing the distributional implications of revenue and expenditure
adjustments* Needless to say, it does not at the same time show
the distributional effects of the fluctuations in the economy that
the adjustments are designed to offset.
The many complications involved in tracing the impact of
budget adjustments on income distribution are beyond the scope of
this study, but it must be pointed out that the problem involves
much more than the extent to which a tax is passed forward or baok-
ward. The ultimate distributional effects can be defined only in
terms of induced changes in the relative prices of various products
and faotors. Thus the extent to which any group gains from the
distributional effeots of an adjustment depends not only on the
effects on its money earnings, but also on changes in the prices
of the goods which that group buys. These effects are demonstrable
only in terms relative to other groups.
The tax system, indeed, is usually designed with the express
purpose of affecting the distribution of income. The impact of
an inoome tax, for example, directly affects distribution by
influencing factor earnings. But the effeots go further than
this* The full distributional impaot must take account not only
of relative reductions in income but also of the effects on the
amount of work done or other resources supplied. To ignore this
latter consideration would be to assume that all faotors are in
perfectly inelastic supply*
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Further, as will be seen later, these induoed changes in
resource supply will have repercussions on the prices of products.
Imperfections in the ooverage of the tax system, and in particular
the way in which it treats income from difference sources
differently, will exaggerate these distortions in resource supply.
The frequent assumption that indireot taxes oause product
prices to inorease by an equal amount and hence fall on consumers
of those products, beoomes untenable under this analysis. That
assumption not only subsumes the perfect inelasticity of consumer
demand for those products but also totally ignores the income
effeots of the tax on consumers of those goods. If a tax oauses
an inorease in commodity prices, both income effeots and substitut¬
ion effeots will alter patterns of consumption and hence also the
real inooiaes of consumers. The way in which consumption is affected
will in turn influenoe the returns to factors employed in industries
which suffer or benefit from the change.
Finally, the form in which the resources are supplied may be
affeoted by fiscal ohanges. Certain adjustments may not only
induce workers to work more but also make them willing to take less
pleasant work. Again, though this is not strictly an induced
reaotion, an improvement in the incomes of poor groups may permit
them to enjoy a higher level of welfare and thereby improve the
quality of their effort. It will be neoessary to return to these
effeots, as well as the effeots on investment decisions, in the
disoussion of incentive effects.
Inoontives ;.'.nd resource supply
In the preoeding disoussion of revenue changes little distinct¬
ion was made between the effeots of different types of taxes.
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These differences beoorae important for the implications of fiscal
adjustments for incentives and the supply of productive faotors.
This aspeot of fisoal changes involves the whole of the theory of
inoidenoe. It is not the present purpose to attempt to deal
with the problems of incidenoe in any detail, yet a brief summary
of the main considerations involved seems necessary to show up the
(45)
distortion effeots of fisoal measures. '
The important incentive effeots of tax ohonges result from two
primary considerations. First there are the distributional features
of the change already mentioned, and whioh will be referred to in
the following paragraphs as income effeots. Of a rather different
nature are substitution effeots which are induced when the marginal
tax rate is greater than or (in the case of benefits) less than
zero.
A poll tax, as distinct from a proportional or progressive
income tax of equal yield, leaves no opportunity for varying one's
liability by altering the amount of work done. Furthermore, it
leaves unchanged the cost of leisure in terms of sacrifice of
earnings.Since, therefore, the imposition of a flat levy has
(45) The problems of inoidenoe oooupy a prominent plaoe in most of
the standard works on public finanoe. Particularly relevant
to the present discussion are Richard A. Musgrave, op. pit..
Part 3J Earl R. Rolph, The Theory of Fiscal Economios,
University of California Press,' Berkeley, 195**, Chapters 10-
12; and Bent Hansen, op. oit.. Part 3-
(46) These effects, whioh follow from a change in the costs of
alternative behaviour patterns, are what A.C. Pigou refers to
as 'announcement effects'. A Study in Publio Finanoe.
Maosdllan A Co. Ltd., London, 1947, pp. 55-56.
(47) With minor qualifications, property rates and death duties
fall into this oategory as well. Incidentally, the recently
modified National Insurance contributions in Britain
constitute a poll tax on employed persons.
no effeot on the rate of substitution between work and leisure, the
result can be interpreted entirely in terras of income effects, and
therefore aqy revenue inorease by this means will tend to stimulate
(48)
the supply of labour.y
On the other hand, a proportional tax on earnings leaves one
free to modify his tax liability through offering more or less
work. Further, such a tax lowers the marginal cost of leisure in
terras of earnings foregone, and this will enoourage the substitut¬
ion of more leisure for less work. The income effeot will
work in the opposite direotion. The net effeot on the amount of
work offered will depend upon the relative strength of the income
and substitution effects and it is difficult to say which will be
the greater. The balance probably varies according to the pre¬
existing level of tax, the absolute and relative level of the
individual's inoome, and other faotors too numerous and perhaps too
tenuous to investigate here.
A proportional tax embodies an identity between the average
and marginal rates of tax on successive slioes of income. In
contrast to this, the usual form of progressive tax provides for
a marginal rate which increases as the level of income increases.
The average rate inoreases as well, though at a slower rate.
Beoause it therefore oauses a progressive fall in the cost of
leisure, any revenue inorease through a progressive tax on earnings
will produce stronger substitution effects than in the case of a
(48) Cf. A.G. Pigou, ibid., pp. 64-65.
(49) This subsumes a declining marginal utility of inoome.
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proportional tax, and the Incentive to reduce work effort will be
to that extent greater.
These effects of marginal tax rates in reducing the returns
from effort and thereby encouraging leisure, are not limited to
income taxes. A similar influenoe is to be expected with sales
and exoise taxes. The implications of a revenue increase through
a tax on commodities are more complicated, however, because the
result depends upon the way the tax is distributed among commodities
and in particular with reference to the complementarity of the taxed
goods with present and future leisure. All that can be reliably
stated here is that in comparison with a proportional inoome tax,
a tax of equal yield levied on commodities will disoourage work
effort more if the goods taxed are complementary to leisure.
The effeot of various forms of revenue changes on the level of
saving can also be summarized in terms of income and substitution
(51)effects.w All taxes have an income effeot insofar as the
taxpayer's abilily to both save and oonsume is reduced.The
weight of this effeot depends upon the average rate of tax. A
substitution effeot on the consumption-savings balance will be
felt only with oertain taxes which discriminate against the post¬
poning of consumption, suoh as taxes on savings and interest. The
(50) For an analysis of these conclusions, see Earl R. Rolph,
op. oit.. Chapter 10.
(51) For a detailed disoussion of these points, see Richard A.
Musgrave, op. oit.. Chapters 12 and 14.
(52) Different taxes will, of course, affect the composition of
consumption as well, and savings adjustments to tax changes
will depend upon individual's motives for saving. The above
remarks are restrioted to generalizations about the probable
reactions of savers as a whole.
impeot of the substitution effect in these oases will depend upon the
marginal tax rate.
Although an income effeot will result from any revenue change,
its importance will vary depending upon the groups affected. In the
earlier disoussion of tax effioienqy, it was argued that insofar as
the marginal propensity to save inoreases toward the upper end of
the income soale, a tax levied on high income groups will decrease
savings more than one of equal yield on low income groups. Thus
a progressive tax on inoome will sffeot savings more than a
proportional tax, and a tax on luxuries more than a tax on
necessities. Similarly an increasing marginal propensity to
save suggests that a proportional inoome tax will off-set savings
more than an equal tax on commodities, even if the latter was
distributed proportionally as well (a general tax on commodities
is regressive in terms of inoome). Finally, if investment income
inoreases as a fraotion of total personal incomes toward the higher
inoome brackets, a tax on "unearned" income will discourage savings
more than one on wages and salaries.
A substitution effeot will reinforce the inoome effect in the
oase of taxes that discriminate in favour of present consumption.
There will, however, be no such influence with a general tax on
oonsumption or on inoome excluding interest. The substitution
effeot, where it occurs (i.e. with taxes on saving and interest),
will be strengthened by any element of progression in the tax
schedule, since progression implies a marginal tax rate which is
above and rising faster than the average rate.
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Finally, some generalisations can be made regarding the effeot
of tax ohanges on investment decisions. Much depends on whether
a tax on business profits affeots produot prioes. Insofar as
prices change as a result of the tax, the reactions associated
with consumption taxes will be involved. If the tax can be
considered primarily to affect the level of net profits, it can
be expected to influence the level of investment and the riskiness
of investment undertakings.
A tax which reduces profits will affeot the disposable income
generated by a given output and will modify expeoted rates of net
profit. This will affect the availability of funds from business
saving and henoe, to the extent that firms depend upon internal
financing for investment, such taxes will alter the supply of
investable funds. The relative balanoe between the tax rates
applicable to undistributed and distributed profits (or undistributed
profits and investment receipts of dividend receivers) will clearly
influence the extent to which business profits are retained, but,
in addition, the actual level of tax on retained earnings of
businesses will determine the amount of funds available for self-
( 5?}
finanoing of investment.v '
(riven the supply of investable funds, the incentive effects
can again be interpreted in terms of income and substitution effects.
A proportional tax on business profits will, if losses are fully
off-set, oreate an income effeot only. If losses are not fully
provided for, substitution effects arise sinoe the government shares
(53) The liquidity effeots on investment is an important reason why
private saving does not have the same fiscal effeots as public
saving of tax revenues.
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the profits hut not (all) losses and hence the private profitability
of risk-taking falls* In any ease, the effect of the tax is to
reduce the net yield to the investor, and where losses are off-set,
his risk is reduoed as well*
The income effect will encourage the investor to attempt to
reooup at least part of his loss in yield* This may he done hy
cither increasing the riskiness of his investments, and hence their
yield, or hy expanding the size of his investments. Both risk-
taking and investment is therefore encouraged. Ihere losses cannot
he off-set, however, the substitution effect serves to discourage
risk-taking sinoe the relative appeal of risky investments falls.
In this case, the net result on the riskiness of investments is
indeterminate, depending upon the relative strengths of the two
effects*
Any progressivity in the tax structure will strengthen the
substitution effect sinoe profits will he reduoed by a higher rate
than losses* Eisky investment will to that extent he discouraged.
The tax system can influence the level of business saving not
only through the actual and relative rates on distributed and
retained earnings hut also hy adjusting the allowances which can
he set against earnings as expenses. This is to say, the tax effects
depend upon the way that taxable income is defined, and this is
particularly important in connection with allowances for depreciation
and the method of evaluating inventories.^^
In summary, if losses are completely off-set against profits,
(54) These considerations are discussed further in Chapter III in
connection with the British tax system.
- 51 -
a tax enoourages investors to invest more and in more risky under¬
takings (though the risk to themselves may he no greater).
Substitution effects arise to counter this influence where losses
oannot be completely off-set or where progression in the tax
structure means that losses are treated on a different basis than
profits. Perhaps most important of all, in periods of prosperity
at least, a tax on business earnings (and particularly savings)
reduces an important source of investable funds and henoe restricts
the oapaoity to invest.
^pending adjustments, by and large, have effects which are the
reverse of comparable ohanges on the tax side. Transfers of a
fixed amount are similar to poll taxes in producing no substitution
effeot, though the income effeot will be opposite. Such transfers,
which are common in the form of pensions and other benefits, will
therefore tend to discourage work effort. Similarly, the effeot of
a transfer which is proportionally related to income, will be
opposite to that of a proportional income tax; the income effeot
being a discouragement and the substitution effeot an encouragement
to work offered. If progression is built into the transfer
schedule, so that the marginal transfer rate falls as income rises,
the substitution effeot loses importance as income increases. If
the marginal transfer rate becomes negative, then the substitution
as well as the inoome effeot will discourage work.
Public spending on goods and services will have an effeot on
inoentives to work depending upon the complementarity of the publio
(55) For a more detailed discussion of these conclusions, see
Riohard A. Musgrave, op. pit.
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servioes or free goods to work and leisure. Expenditures on
health and education facilities, if these increase productivity and
real wages, will lead to an income effect which is adverse, and a
substitution effeot which is favourable to work. The extent to
which public goods compete with private production will discourage
effort any complementarity between these goods and work will
increase effort.
The supply of savings will be affeoted by the way in which
public spending discriminates in favour of future or present
consumption. Transfers in the form of health and old age benefits
reduoe the need for saving and henoe produce a bias in favour of
oonsumption. Again, the effeot on saving of public provision of
goods and services will depend upon the complementarity of these
goods to present or future oonsumption.
Finally, subsidies to business will have analgous but reverse
effeots to business taxation. A subsidy on business profits which
does not also increase business losses encourages risk-taking and
promotes investment. The effeot of public purchases will depend
upon their complementarity to private business. The provision of
soeial capital, for example, will encourage, and of competitive
enterprises will discourage, private investment.
Publio costs and the sooial balanoe
Mention has already been made of the possibility of conflict
between the pursuit of economic stability and other public objectives.
(56) The importance of adequate consideration to other objectives of
economic policy and to the institutional difficulties involved
are emphasized by Max F. Millikan, "Objectives for Economic
Policy in a Democracy", in Income Stabilization for a Developing
Democracy, (Max F. Millikan, Editor), New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1953» pp. 12-75.
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These other aims, which may demand equal or even greater priority,
inolude an equitable distribution of income, a high rate of growth,
striking the proper balanoe between the several levels of public
authorities, and preventing undesirable fluctuations in the balanoe
of payments. The relative importance of these aims depends, to a
greater or lesser extent, on political and sooial opinion. Further
important considerations concern the proper allocation of resources
between the public and private sectors of the economy.
Mien fiscal policy results in a budget deficit, the cost of
public activity is understated in terms of public revenues.
Similarly, a budget surplus superficially distorts public costs
upward. If the community as a whole arrives at an optimum level of
public services by balanoing the benefits against their cost in
terms of taxes, this distortion of the sacrifice involved may lead
to an unwarranted expansion or contraction of the activities of the
public seotor. On the other hand, if the cost was always accurate¬
ly reflected (as with a consistently balanced budget) and assuming
the income elasticity of demand for public servioes is positive, the
demand for publio services would vary in a way which, if satisfied,
would aggravate business cycles.
Theoretically, at least, it can be argued that the aotivity of
the public sector should be determined in terms of the optimum for
the community in full employment equilibrium, and this level should
not be altered in response to business fluctuations. This suggests
that although spending changes can be shown to have the most potent
effeot on demand, fiscal measures should rather take the form of
tax and transfer adjustments. This is to say that the allooation
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function of governments should be dealt 7,1th in a context of a full
employment level of resouroe utilisation, and although income
oorreotion can be made through spending changes, more can be
accomplished (i.e. distortion can be avoided) if reliance is placed
instead on revenue and transfer changes.
This generalization becomes invalid only if the level of publio
services is not optimal to begin with or if special public activities
are required to prevent short-run distortions. Perhaps more
important, changes in public works may be the only practicable
course if the dislocations are of a regional nature.
Eoonomio growth
The effects of various forms of fiscal policy on the long run
rate of growth of the economy are exceedingly complex, and no more
than a general statement of the problem is attempted here. It is
important to recognise, however, that once the prospect of economic
growth is introduced, the problem of stabilization becomes one of
maintaining full employment and price stability not at a given
equilibrium level of output but on a moving equilibrium growth path.
Moreover, the growth path itself may well be influenced by the
stabilization policy.
Clearly, the effects of fiscal adjustments outlined in the
preceding pages will indirectly influence the rate of growth as well.
Any prediction of the ultimate effeet on the growth pattern will
depend to a veiy large extent upon the weights attributed to the
different foroes at work and the simplifications and assumptions
(57) See Bent Hansen, op. oit.. Chapter XVI and Richard A. Musgrave,
QP. cit., pp. 517-525.
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made about the way in which fiscal changes react on income
distribution, incentives, investment decisions, and so on.
Fiscal measures designed to off-set fluctuations around the
growth trend do not differ in principle from the control of
fluctuations in a static setting. On the other hand, the effeot
of fiscal policies on the rate of growth of output itself involves
(58)
complicated considerations of incidence changes through time.
There are, to begin with, the problems mentioned earlier regarding
the possible divergence between the levels of output at which
labour and oapaoity become fully employed. This possibility takes
on greater significance when the rates of growth of employable
labour and useable oapaoity have to be reconciled. In addition,
all the incidence effeots which influenoe the supply of resources
take on a new importance for the long run, particularly those
effeots which alter the distribution of income.
Finally, the irapaot of public transactions on the long run
balanoe between demand and output is more complicated, and extremely
difficult to predict with any degree of preoision. Again, apy
estimate will depend heavily on the assumptions made about the nature
(58) See Douglas Dosser, "Tax inoidenoe and growth", The Soonomio
Journal. Vol# LXXI, No. 283, September 1961, pp. 572-591» for a
statement of the complications that arise over inoidenoe in a
growth context, and Richard A. Musgrave, op. oit.. Chapter 20,
for examples of how some incidence effeots oan be incorporated
in growth models.
(59) For an examination of the variables and relationships involved,
see A.T. Peaoock, "The Public Sector and the Theory of Economic
Growth", Scottish Journal of Political Eoonomy. Vol. II,
February 1959, and Kiaohsrd A. Musgrave, op. oit., Chapter 20.
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of the economy and its reaotions to fisoal changes.
In this connection, the ways in which the budget affects the
distribution of public and private spending between consumption and
investment is especially relevant. An encouragement to investment
at the expense of consumption may well increase the rate of capacity
growth. The effeot on demand, however, is less clear and the
problem becomes one of reoonoiling the "required" and "aotual" rates
of growth.
4* Implications for Automatioity
In view of the above general remarks oonoerning fisoal adjust¬
ments it is possible to draw some conclusions about the speoial
implications of automatic as distinct from discretionary fiscal
controls. Before proceeding in the next ohapter to a detailed
analysis of the nature of automatic controls in the economic structure
of the United Kingdom, it will be useful to outline the ways in whioh
these devices require a modification of the implications of fisoal
measures discussed on the preceding pages.
Hie fisoal authority is usually considered to be responsible
for initiating the kinds of fisoal correctives implied above, and
indeed an overwhelming share of the literature on compensatory
publio finanoe deals with discretionary forms of fisoal control.
To some extent, however, the required adjustments are brought about
automatically through the action of so-called built-in stabilizers.
A built—in stabilizer can be defined as any mcohansim whioh,
without discretionary interference, will tend automatically to bring
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about counter-cyclical adjustments in total income. These
automatic adjustments may occur on either the revenue or expend¬
iture sides of the budget and can be attributed to two distinct
forces. Firstly, they may be caused by an expansion or contraction
in the size of the tax or expenditure base. Thus, during a
depression, it is reasonable to expect a contraction in the base of
an indirect tax levied on goods with a high inoorae elasticity of
demand, and a widening of base for unemployment benefit payments.
Conversely, during an inflation with rising inoome and employment,
the tax base will tend to expand and the unemployment benefit base
contract. Thus, oven if the respective rates of tax and benefits
remain fixed, the adjustments in their bases will tend to create
appropriate counter-cyclical adjustments in the budget.
Secondly, given the tax or payments base, an appropriate adjust¬
ment may occur in tax or benefit rates. In the case of a progress¬
ive tax on incomes, for example, it is to be expected that an increase
in average incomes during inflation will cause not only an increase
in the tax base (taxable income) but also an increase in the average
(as well as the marginal) rate of tax as incomes fall into higher
(60) There will be oooasion later to refer to certain automatic
de-stabilizing pressures, infra, p.101.
(61) "Formula flexibility" or the advanoe provision for stabilizing
measures to be implemented if eertain indicators exceed fixed
limits, is not dealt with here since prescribed adjustments
oannot be considered automatic. The proposal that national
insurance contributions should be made to vary in response to
movements in the unemployment rate is of this type. See the
1944 Miite Paper on Employment Policy, op. cit., para. 68 et
seq. This form of control is discussed by Richard A.
Musgrave, op. clt.. pp. 512-515.
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rat© brackets. On the expenditure side, a system of prioe guarant¬
ees for agricultural products would result in an increase in rates
payable as prices decline. The automatio fiscal effects of these
institutional provisions, it is probably safe to say, are entirely
fortuitous, but this does not detract in any way from the need for
an understanding of their economic impaot.
Apart from the economic implications of automatic controls as
distinot from discretionary measures, are important politico-legal
considerations. Any disoretionaxy adjustments require the exercise
of political prerogative over the funotions of the public purse.
Automatic adjustments, by definition, operate passively as a result
of pre-existing statutory provisions. Thus judgement can be
passed about the relative superiority of automatio over discrete
controls on the basis of one's convictions regarding the limits to
the legitimate mandate of the government. This problem, an
interesting one in itself, is not of direct concern in this present
oontext and, having been mentioned, will not be investigated
further.(62^
The likelihood of fiscal measures conflicting with other
budgetary aims and with the activities of the private sector has been
emphasised. Automatio adjustments are unlikely to be entirely
neutral in this respeot, but since they involve no policy changes
in the budgetary system, and sinoe the predictability of their
action removes a good deal of uncertainly, they are less likely to
interfere with other budgetary aims, private activities, and
expeotations than discrete fiscal changes.
(62) For a discussion of this problem, see Samuel H. Beer, op. olt..
Chapter IV.
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Clearly, the problems of recognition of adverse eoonomi©
movements and analysis of trends are irrelevant for automatic
controls* The thermostatic movements of built-in devices will
be aotivated by the manifestation of the need itself and will
operate regardless of the nature (dynamic or statio) of the
fluctuation* With regard to the problems associated with initiat¬
ing oorreetive notion, automatie controls have a similar advantage.
The programme inflexibilities which hinder discretionary measures
are obviously entirely avoided when the provisions for adjustments
are built into the system.
Time inflexibilities may also be expected to be less serious.
Since the problems of recognition and analysis are circumvented,
the recognition lag is removed altogether* The administrative lag
is likewise eliminated. Since the automatic adjustments take
plaoe as a result of already existing statutory provisions, no new
authority is required. Moreover, insofar as no new machinery or
administrative organisation is needed, the operational lag involved
in initiating the controls disappears. Undoubtedly, one of the
unique values of automatic control arises from its avoidance of the
difficulties of introducing new control measures in a short time.
The significance of the final lag, that between the initiation
of the corrective and the fruition of results, is less clear. The
duration of this lag depends largely on the nature of the adjust¬
ment.
For a given adjustment, the time between the change in tax or
expenditure and its isapaot on the eoonony will not likely be affected
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■fay whether the change is automatic or otherwise. Therefore the
problem beeome3 one of whether the automatic devices are of a type
which ©an be expected to react quiokly. But even if this final
lag is no shorter for automatic controls (and, as will be seen in
the next section, there is a strong probability that it will be
shorter) there are nevertheless good a priori grounds for expecting
the total time lag involved to be shorter than for discretionary
changes.
As far as the distortive aspects of fiscal controls are concern¬
ed, there is unlikely to be any great difference whether the adjust¬
ments are automatic or discretionary. A given automatic adjustment
will have the same irapaot on induced demand, income distribution,
and apparent public costs as a discrete change of the same form and
strength. Nevertheless, one would intuitively expect a different
subjective reaction to automatio changes, particularly in connection
with their effect on incentives. Since these adjustments are built
into the system and involve no budgetary changes, the reaotion of
consumers and investors nay well be less marked, especially in the
short run. This would be most likely in connection with the
behavioural changes resulting from substitution effects brought
about by an alteration in the terras of alternative choices, such as
between work and leisure. Thus the more subtle adjustments of
automatio devioes are likely to result in more moderate reaotions,
although the extent of this difference must remain high conjectural.
Changes induced in the balance between the public and private
seotors will be similar to those resulting from discrete changes;
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but here again the earlier conolusions require modification. Built-
in reactions, although they involve similar adjustments in the publio
sector*s share and control of resources, do not, by definition,
involve any change in the funotion of the state or the scope of its
responsibilities. The avoidance of any interference with the role
of the public seotor, in addition to its political significance,
will reduce uncertainty in the private seotor about the government's
fiscal activities. Indeed, insofar as these regulators oan be
depended upon to dampen the amplitude of business cycles, their
•ffeots will be cumulative, sinoe more gentle fluctuations tend to
reduce the incentives to business men to behave in a manner which
aggravates cycles, and may even encourage them to act in a counter¬
cyclical manner. Such an effeot would result, of course, only if
the controls were largely successful.
The probable reduction in total time lags associated with
automatic changes would lessen the likelihood of perverse effects
by increasing the correlation between the adverse movement in income
and the off-setting movement of the corrective. Moreover, the faot
that these controls are automatically initiated ly the occurrence of
a fluctuation, means that they will take effect gradually as the
adverse situation materializes, usually increasing in strength the
more adverse the situation becomes. This suggests that not only are
they unlikely to exert too heavy an impact, but also that the more
gradual corrective pressure will minimize the dislocations of
adjustments.
It may be argued, however, that this feature is not entirely
advantageous. Their sensitivity to income changes means that these
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devices moderate the impact of their own corrective foroe, and as a
result delay the return to "normal". Thus in a recession, for
example, after the automatic devices have operated to lighten tax
payments and expand government expenditures, the return to normal
would be hastened if the stabilisers remained inoperative until
recovery was complete, rather than exerting their dampening effect
en the increasing income and expenditure*
In this respeot an understanding of the strength of automatio
stabilisers is vitally important for the formulation of discretionary
policy. Clearly, in inflation it will be necessary to increase tax
rates and change expenditure policies less if automatic regulators
are at work. Similarly, acre moderate action will be in order
during a depression.
In the light of the above discussion it may be concluded that
in addition to the politioal considerations concerning the discretion¬
ary power of governments, automatic adjustments have important
advantages of a technical nature, in the short run, at least. They
avoid the structural rigidities of the adjustment process and much
of the time loss associated with discrete changes. They probably
also avoid many of the reactions associated with uncertainty about
government action and some of the behavioural adjustments of
consumers and investors. For these reasons their effects are less
likely to become perverse and more likely to mitigate adverse economic
fluctuations. Nevertheless, these advantages will weigh in favour
of automatic regulators only insofar as they can exert a significant
impact on the eoonomie system.
CHAPTER III
AUTOMATIC FISCAL DEVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
"The ideal to be aimed at is some corrective
influence which would oome into play auto¬
matically - on the analogy of a thermostatic
control - in accordance with rules determin¬
ed in advance and well understood by the
public."
(1944 White Paper on Employment Policy)
By and large, the government specifies only the rates of tax
liability and benefit payments. Tax yields and money payments -
and hence the budget balance - therefore vary in response to
changes in the tax (or payments) base which oocur as a result of
movements in the eoonony. It is these fluctuations whioh create
the automatic budgetary offsets to economic swings. The growth
of the public sector and the consequent increase in rates and
coverage of taxes and payments has strengthened these automatic
fiscal reactions and hence given rise to the need to examine and
quantify their fiscal impact.
Before proceeding to the discussion of flexibility, however,
It should be noted that the sise of the government budget is
itself an important determinant of the public sector's contribution
to stability.
Apart from any imbalance between the two sides of the budget,
the publio sector represents a part of the total econoay that is to
some extent immune from the vicissitudes that cause fluctuations in
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the private sector. Public investment expenditure, which now forms
a large share of total oapital formation, is not sensitive to the
shifts in business expectations which is a principal cause of
irregularities in the rate of private investment. Similarly, for a
variety of reasons discussed in the last chapter, the real rate of
public consumption expenditure is fairly fixed, in the short run at
least. Partly because of this, the labour foree of the public
sector is virtually immune to the risk of cyclical unemployment.
Thus even if revenues and expenditures are not deliberately
manipulated to off-set fluctuations, the inherent stability of
public spending provides a stable oore of demand which limits the
scope for overall fluctuations. It follows that the larger the
public share of total spending the more stable will be the total
demand on the eoonoay.
In 1959* the share of the public seotor's total expenditure in
the United Kingdom's gross national product was almost double the
(63)
pre-war level. There has been a particularly sharp increase in
publio current expenditure in the form of transfers. Current grants
to persons have increased by one-half over their pre-war level.
(63) The increase was from 19*73 per cent in 1938 to 32*73 per cent
in 1959* Calculated from National Inoome and Expenditure 1956
and i960. Tables 1 and 4*
(64) In 1938> national insuranoe benefits and other current grants
to persons (i.e. national assistance, family allowances, war
pensions, scholarships and grants to non-profit-making bodies
serving persons) amounted to 4.83 per cent of gross national
product! in 1959 this figure had increased to 7.38 per oent.Ibid. These figures exclude expenditure on subsidies and debt
intor@sts
These transfers, which consist mainly of retirement pensions,
sickness, injury, maternity, and widows' benefits, and unemployment
payments serve to direotly stabilize the disposable income of the
beneficiaries.
The growth in government spending has been paralleled by an
expansion in the public share of national income. Thus, by and
large, tax rates are higher, and their coverage greater than in
1938.
In the present discussion, however, the primary concern is
vsith budgetary changes which are automatically induced by ohanges
in eoonomie activity. For the present the disoussion will be
concerned with those flexible devices whioh tend to have a stabiliz¬
ing effect in the context of a static econony, though it will
generally apply as well to a dynamic eeonony in the short ran. Aiy
device, therefore, which tends automatically to increase public
revenues or decrease expenditures in periods of inflationary pressure
or reduce revenues or inorease expenditure in periods of depression,
(65)
will be of relevance.
The stabilizing effeot of an automatic fiscal device must be
evaluated not only in terms of the extent to whioh the tax or payment
base and rate ohange in sympathy with a changing level of income, but
(65) Cary Brown defined automatic stabilizers as devices which exert
pressure to bring the econony back to equilibrium} "The Statio
Theory of Automatic Flsoal Stabilization", Journal of
Political Soonony, Vol. 63, No. 5» October 1955» PP* 427-440.
This is a much narrower definition than that adopted here,
whioh includes aiy device which dampens down the amplitude of
a fluctuation.
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also in terms of the size of the particular device in relation to
the eoonony. Tims, a small proportionate change in the yield of
an important source of revenue such as the income tax will have a
greater stabilising effect than a proportionately larger change in
an insignificant tax whose yield is much more sensitive to income
changes. The size of a particular device will depend upon the
tax (or payment) base and the average rate of tax (or payment) on
that base.
furthermore, as discussed earlier, the speed with which any
device responds to an income change is of critical importance for
its stabilizing effeot. Indeed, "Automatic machinery is not usually-
thought superior to manual methods if it operates at a much slower
speed, and fiscal policy is no exception." It is therefore
in terms of these two major considerations of size and speed of
operation that the efficiency of any built-in stabilizer must be
judged.
1. Revenue Adjustments; Inoome tax on persons
Approximately one quarter of the central government's total
receipts from taxes (including national Insurance and health
contributions) is derived from the income tax paid out of personal
(67)
income .v ' In faot, the income tax as such is more important
(66) A.R. Prest, op. oit.. p. 97*
(67) In 1959, 25*33 per cent of total tax reoeipts arose out of the
inoome tax on personal incomes. Calculated from National
Income and Expenditure 1960. Tables 2 and 35 (for the purposes
of this discussion, the term "total reoeipts from taxation"
inoludes national insuranoe and health contributions; total
reoeipts from taxation comprised 92.76 per cent of the total
revenue aocount of the oentral government in 1959> Ibid.)
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than this, since it applies to companies as well as persons, but it
will be convenient to examine its impact on corporate income
separately. That part of the income tax paid by persons is in
Itself the largest single source of revenue for the central
government, and hence rates highest of the fiscal weapons in terms
of size.
A priori there is good reason to expect the tax on individual
incomes to show oounter-cyoilcal flexibility both of the tax base
and of the effective tax rate* The tax code consists of a standard
rate of tax with a variety of personal allowances for family and
other responsibilities and reduced tax rates on lower incomes. Thus
the tax is progressive between the exemption limit and the standard
(68)
rate bracket.v As total incomes increase during an inflationary
period more incomes will rise above the exemption limit and become
taxable. Thus the tax base will expand, showing a positive tax
base flexibility. Furthermore, as income increase and fall into
higher rate brackets, the average rate of tax will tend to increase,
showing a positive rate flexibility.
These conclusions, however, assume no change in relative
distribution of taxable income. If this assumption is removed it
(68) It may be argued that the tax is progressive throughout; th©
exempted incomes falling into the zero rate bracket and high
incomes falling into a very broad top bracket chargeable at
the standard rate. This is in the nature of a semantic
argument and will not be pursued here. For a discussion of
the interpretation of tax progression, see R.A. Musgrave and
Tun Thin, "Income Tax Progression", (1929-1948), The Journal
of Political Economy. Vol. LVI, No. 6, December 1948.
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is ty no means certain that the average rate of tax will increase
with rising incomes. It is not unrealistic, for example, to expect ^
a large number of incomes grouped ^ust below the exemption limit.
As all incomes increase, this concentration of incomes will move up
into the lowest rate bracket. When this happens, the tendenoy
for the average rate of tax to increase as a result of upper
Incomes moving into still higher liability brackets will be off-set
by a higher proportion of incomes falling into the lowest rate
brackets. A similar case might result if the income increase
occurred largely to wage earners who were concentrated in the lowest
rate braokets. Under these conditions, although the tax base
flexibility ensures that the tax yield will inorease, the average
(69)
rate of tax may actually fall. '
The final consideration is that of speed of operation. In
this connection it is neoessaxy to distinguish the portion of tax
collected annually in arrears from that withheld from earnings
under the pay-as-you-earn (Schedule E) scheme.
(63) The likelihood of this effect is increased when the income tax,
which embodies no rate increase above the standard rate, is
considered (as it is here) separately from the surtax, since
the latter ensures that the higher incomes will beoome liable
at still higher rates, pulling the average rate upward.
(70) For an outline of the structure of the income tax system in
the United Kingdom, see Central Office of Information,
The British System of Taxation. H.M.S.O., London, 1958, pp.
12-19, or Ursula Hioks, Public Finance, op. cit., 183-18*7.
For a muoh more detailed account, see H.A.R.J. Wilson,
Spioer and Peeler's Income Tax and Profits Tax, 20th edition,
H.F.L. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1953*
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Roughly two thirds of all income tax paid on personal income
(71)
is deducted at source through the P.A.Y.E. Scheme. ' The deduct¬
ion of the tax in this way before the income is received ensures
that there can be virtually no implementation lag between the
initiation of a tax rate change and the fruition of results by way
(72)
of a change in payments.
Similarly, the deduction of tax at source from interest and
dividend payments involves no lag between the receipt of income
and the payment of tax on it. In this case, however, there may be
a significant lag between the earning of the income by the company
(71) In 1958, personal income tax payments amounted to £1569 mill¬
ions (i.e. £1730 millions tax on income payments minus £161
millions surtax). National Income and Expenditure 1960,
Tables 2 and 35. In the financial year 1958-59, £1026 mill-
ions was deducted under the P.A.Y.E. scheme; which amounts
to 65*39 per cent of the 1958 calendar year income tax
payments. One Hundred and Third Report of the Commissioners
of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the Year Ended 31st
March, 1960. H.M.S.O.. Cod. 1258. London. 1961 (henceforth
103rd Inland Revenue Report) Table 60. It should be noted
that the estimates of personal income tax payments are not
independently determined in the national income statistics,
but are derived by deducting from total income tax payments
the estimated payments of companies, public corporations,
and foreigners. Surtax payments are separately recorded by
the Inland Revenue Department. The reliability of the
estimates of payments is, however, deemed to be good. See
Central Statistical Office, National Income Statistics
Sources and Methods. H.M.S.O., London, 1956 (henceforth
Sourpes and Methods). p. 63.
(72) It appears that the effect is felt very quickly not only by
the taxpayer but by the exchequer as well. In the 1958-59
financial year, for example, over 99 per cent of the total
amount of P.A.Y.E. tax dedueted by employers was paid in cash




or borrower and the payment of that income as interest and dividends. '
Nevertheless, as far as the individual income receiver is concerned,
his tax payment and income receipt is simultaneous. The lag
involved between the earning of the income and its distribution is
governed by company accounting procedure and will be discussed further
under corporate taxation.
The remaining classes of personal income are the profits from
trade of individuals, incomes from professions assessable under
Schedule 0, and individuals' profits from the occupation of land.
The normal basis of assessment of these categories of income is the
profit made (or income earned) in the taxpayers accounting year
ending In the preceding year of assessment. Sinoe the tax is
assessed and becomes payable not more than twelve months after the
end of any individual's accounting year, it follows that the lag
between the actual receipt of the income and the payment of tax
thereon can vary from a maximum of three years when the accounting
period ends at the beginning of a financial year to one year, when
the accounting period ends at the end of a financial year. If the
ianose is regarded as existing only after the year's profits are
determined (i.e. at the end of the accounting period) then the lag
is reduced to a maximum of two and a minimum of something less than
one year.
(73) The amount of tax falling on interest and dividends is consider¬
able but cannot be ascertained because it is determined not
only by the standard rate deduction at source, but also by the
marginal rate applicable to the incomes of individual
recipients.
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To some extent taxpayers set aside reserves against tax
liabilities as they aoorue. Insofar as this practice is followed*
the significance of the time lag for stabilizing considerations is
eliminated. However, such earmarking of tax accruals is much less
( 7ii.)
likely in the case of individuals than for corporate bodies.
It oan therefore be concluded that the characteristics of the
income tax on personal incomes suggest that it will tend to have a
substantial built-in flexibility. It is of prime importance as a
source of public revenue. Its progressive structure provides the
possibility for both tax base and tax rate sensitivity to income
changes. Finally, the deduction of the largest proportion of the
tax is simultaneous with the receipt of income so that time lags
are essentially eliminated.
Surtax
The surtax schedule complements the income tax system by
continuing the progressivity of tax liabilities above the standard
rate. It represents an additional duty on individuals' incomes
( 75}
which exceed four thousand pounds per year.v' '
(74) The Central Statistical Office is of the same opinion.
Although the national income accounts assume that persons
establish a reserve against future tax payments, * .... it is
doubtful whether many in fact do so." Individuals and
companies have the opportunity of purchasing Tax Reserve
Certificates to set off against future tax payments (see
footnote 96, infra, p. 85).
(75) The effective starting point for surtax was raised from £2000
to £4000 by the 1961 Finance Act, which made the earned income
relief applicable to inoome tax deductable for surtax as well,
and introduced a special earnings allowance for surtax payers.
In effect, all earned incomes below £5000 per year are exempt.
See the Financial Statement (l96l-6g). H.M.S.G., April 1961,(henceforth Financial Statement (19o1-62). For a description
of the surtax schedule effective prior to 1961-62 see 103rd
Inland Revenue Report, p. 80.
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In terns of slse it is much less important than the income tax,
(76)
accounting for only about one-tenth as much revenue. '
Like the income tax, the surtax lends itself well to base and
rate flexibility* Indeed, it is likely that base flexibility will
be considerably greater than in the case of the income tax, because
the tax schedule falls on incomes above the concentrated middle
income groups (and hence on the upper 'tail* of the curve of income
distribution). This means that the number of incomes and taxable
income is more highly concentrated toward the surtax exemption
(77)
limit and below.v ' As a result, a small Increase in the level
of inoomes will - assuming the distribution of income remains
unchanged - cause & proportionately larger increase in the amount of
income falling under the taxj and a small fall in total income will
reduce the amount of taxable income by a proportionately greater
amount. The base flexibility will therefore tend to be greater than
in the case of the income tax, where the number of taxable inoomos
falls off toward the lower end of the tax schedule.
However, this concentration of taxable income toward the lower
end of the rate schedule will tend to offset rate flexibility. The
(76) In 1959, the surtax yield accounted for 2.66 per cent of total
tax receipts. The relative importance of the surtax will
undoubtedly be reduced, temporarily at least, by the increase in
the exemption limit provided for in the 1961 Finance Act. The
Treasury estimates that the changes will reduce the surtax
yield by £83 million by 1963. This amount constitutes
46.89 per cent of the 1958-9 surtax yield. Financial State¬
ment (1961-62). p.
TcifoX© *72*
(77) See the classification of personal incomes by ranges of inooase
for 1958-59# 103rd Inland Revenue Report. Table 64.
steep marginal rat© sohedule of the surtax oode would in itself
tend to produce a high degree of rate flexibility* But sinoe,
during an increase in incomes, a relatively large number of inoomes
(and amount of income) move into the tax schedule and become liable
for tax at the lowest rates, the average rate of tax may even fall.
Thus an increase in the yield may be accompanied by a fall in the
average effective tax rate.
Surtax is paid in arrears " .... as a deferred instalment of
income tax on or before the first of January following the year of
assessment." Thus surtax payments involve a time lag greater
by one year than income tax payments outside the P.A.Y.E. scheme.
The income tax assessed in any assessment year is for the most
part paid in the last quarter of that year, whereas the surtax
assessed in that same year is generally paid in the last quarter
of the next financial year. The effeots of this considerable lag
between accrual and payment are circumvented only insofar as
surtax payers make provisions for tax liabilities as they aocrue.
This can hardly be considered general praotioe in the personal
seotor.
In summary, the surtax is likely to show a high degree of
automatic sensitivity to changing levels of personal income. But
its small relative size, and the considerable time lags between
aoorual and payments suggest that its automatic flexibility will
have much less compensatory effect than the Income tax.
(78) 103rd Inland Revenue Report, p. 81.
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National Insurance and Health Contributions
Revenue from national insurance and health contributions is not
part of the general budgetary revenue of the central government
and the funds are kept quite distinct from ordinary revenue.
Nevertheless, in view of their compulsory nature these contributions
can, for present purposes at least, be regarded as a direct tax on
earnings. Moreover, following the prooedure adopted in the national
income accounts, both the employers' and employees' shares of
contributions may be treated as a direct tax falling on the
(79)
recipients of income from employment or self-employment♦x '
The National Insuranoe Acts provide that a weekly contribution
must, except in special oases, be paid by or on behalf of every
income receiver between school-leaving age and 65 years (60 years
for women). In the vast majority of cases, the contribution is
shared between the employee and employer.
In terms of slae, the national insurance and health
contributions are exceeded in importance only by the direct taxes
on personal and corporate incomes, and account for over fourteen per
(79) See Souroes and Methods. p. 63. A similar approach is adopt¬
ed and justified by Allan M. Garter, Redistribution of Inoo.
in Postwar Britain. Yale University Press, New York, 1
p. 159« (See also his footnote p. 39).
It should be noted that for purposes of analysing the
incidence of these contributions, this simplification would
require considerable qualification. See Ursula Hicks,
Public Finance, op. pit., pp. 219*221.
(80) For an outline of the provisions for contributions, see the
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance for
the year 1959. H.M.S.O.. Cmd. 11^3. Londanr August iQ&n (howflp.
forth Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance. 19591 Chapter VII.
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oent of total tax revenue.v '
Briefly, the contribution consists of a flat rate levy (which
includes the national health and, where applicable, industrial
injuries charges) shared between the employee and employer, the
employee bearing more than half the total. These flat-rate
contributions oover all earnings up to nine pounds per week.
In addition, since April 1961, a graduated contribution is
paid on an earnings over nine and up to fifteen pounds per week.
The charge does not inorease on earnings over fifteen pounds. The
graduated contribution, which amounts to eight and one-half per
oent of weekly earnings between nine and fifteen pounds, is divided
V
equally between employee and employer.
The present flat-rate contribution ( and indeed the whole
contribution as it existed before April 1961) represents a poll tax
on employment. Since liability depends upon employment rather
than on the level of income, payments will vary in a straight-line
relationship with employment. The base flexibility, therefore,
will be proportional to the change in employment. The fixed level
(81) In 1959, national insurance and health contributions amounted
to £898 millions or 14*14 per cent of total tax receipts.
National Income and Expenditure 1960. Table 35. It is likely
that both the absolute and relative importance of these
contributions in oentral government revenues will be greater
in later years as a result of the graduated contributions
introduced in April 1961 (see footnote 82).
(82) A male employee, for example, bears nine shillings and nine-
pence, or 54 per oent of the total contribution of eighteen
shillings and twopence.
For further details conoerning the nature of contributions,
see the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, A Guide
to the New Graduated Pension Soheme Leaflet N.I. 111.
January. 1961; also, the Report of the Ministry of Pensions
and National Insurance for the Year 1959, op* eit*.
Chapter III.
of contributions regardless of income level means that the tax is
regressive and the rate flexibility is negative.
The provisions for a supplementary graduated schedule, however,
disrupt the direct proportionality between payments and employment
and introduce a less regressive element into the contribution
system. As weekly earnings rise above nine pounds, contributions
will increase. Nevertheless, the increase will be only in
proportion to the new increments of earnings. Sinoe the
proportional payments are in addition to the flat-rate levy, the
tax remains regressive, though more mildly so. On income over
fifteen pounds the contribution is fixed: the tax reverts to a
regressive poll tax and the rate of flexibility becomes as strongly
negative as with the flat-rate levy alone. To put the same thing
in other terms, the marginal tax rate is aero on incomes up to nine
pounds per week, constant and eight and one-half per cent on incomes
between nine and fifteen pounds, and zero on incomes above fifteen
pounds. The average tax rate therefore declines throughout.
Flat-irate contributions are paid by fixing or impressing stamps
on cards or (for large employers) by dieque. The graduated
contributions are collected in association with P.A.Y.E. income tax.
In both oases there is virtually no time lag; the payment of
contributions being simultaneous with the receipt of earnings.
The built-in flexibility of national insurance contributions
is therefore likely to be significant. It is, first of all, one
of the very largest single souroes of central government ourrent
revenue. Moreover, the tax base fluctuates very closely with changes
in the level of employment. Finally, there is no time lag between
-Ti¬
the receipt of earnings and the payment of contributions. Only the
negative rate flexibility fails to contribute to the compensatory
impact of the tax.
It should be observed, however, that the off-setting effects
of those contributions are likely to be greater during a downswing
than during inflation. In a depression, the tax base will oontraot
and contributions decline, thus tending toward a reduction in
government revenues• Above the full employment level, however, the
tax base beoomes inelastic and, except for the small amount of
proportional liability provided by the graduated schedule, liabilit¬
ies will not expand.
Taxes on corporate income
Income tax is payable on the total net inoome of companies at
the standard rate. Net income for inoome tax purposes is profit
oaloulated broadly aooording to commercial accounting principles
but with oertain modifications, particularly in oonneotion with
depreoiation allowances.The traditional British oonoeption
of a corporate body being indistinct from its shareholders is
reflected in the tax system where the income tax paid on distributed
company profits is regarded as having been paid on behalf of the
recipient bond or share-holder, and is therefore a payment out of
the receiver's income. Interest or dividend recipients who are
individuals are entitled to olaim against this income any of the
(83) For a summary of the important difference in the calculation
of profits for income tax purposes, see 100th Inland Revenue
Report, 1957* pp. 3-14.
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personal allowances and reliefs which may be due to them and may thus,
in appropriate oases, obtain repayment of the whole or part of the
tax. In effect, therefore, the tax which is borne by the oompany
oonsists of the standard rate on retained profits. With certain
simplifying assumptions regarding inoidenoe, it can thus be regarded
as a proportional tax on the undistributed profits of corporate
bodies.
In addition to the income tax, ooopanies are liable to profits
tax.^8^ Profits tax, as it is at present constituted, oonsists
of a flat peroentage charge on profits, both distributed and
undistributed, and, sinoe 1952, is not allowable as a deduction in
computing profits for income tax purposes. Certain specific
concessions apply, however, in the case of profits tax.^8-^
Subject to these minor modifications, profits for profits tax
purposes are calculated as for inoame tax. Companies, therefore,
pay two proportional taxes; the profits tax rate on all profits,
and the standard income tax rate on that portion not distributed.
(84) Profits tax is also payable on the profits of trade or busi¬
ness (including the holding of investments) oarried on in the
United Kingdom by unincorporated societies or other bodies,
or carried on abroad by bodies ordinarily resident in the
United Kingdom. However, " .... except for small amounts
from other sectors, which can be closely estimated, these
taxes fall only on companies." Sourpes and Methods, p. 66.
(85) Income from investments (other than 'franked investment
income') is subjeot to tax, and interest on borrovfod money
is deductable. No tax is payable on profits not exceeding
£2,000 in a given accounting period and on profits between
£2,000 and £12,000 an abatement is allowed. See 103rd
Inland Revenue Report, pp. 88-89.
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For present purposes, these oan be considered together. It may be
noted that if the share of profits retained remained constant, the
two levies would constitute a fixed proportional charge on total
net income.
These two taxes on profits taken together provide a source of
revenue which, in size, is second only to the taxes on personal
incomes; oomprising 3ome fifteen per cent of total tax revenue.v '
In terms of size, therefore, taxes on profits comprise a potentially
powerful fiscal tool.
The built-in flexibility of the corporate tax depends upon the
way income is defined for tax purposes. An important consideration
in this regard is the treatment of depredation. The depredation
charged in the business aooounts is not permitted for income tax
purposes. There is instead a comprehensive system of allowances
covering all the main olaases of capital assets. The provisions
vary between different classes of assets but generally an "initial"
or "investment" allowance is deductable when the asset is acquired,
annual allowances until the asset is completely written off or ceases
to be used, and a final balanoing allowance (or charge) to bring the
total allowances (other than any investment allowance) into line with
the difference between cost and any disposal prooeeds. All
charges are based on the original cost of the assets. The initial
(86) In 1959, 15-22 per oent of total tax revenue was derived from
taxes on the income of corporate bodies. (A negligible
amount - probably less than 0.5 per cent - of these corporate
tax payments oonsisted of excess profits tax and exoess profit
levy payments carried forward from years when these additional
charges were In force.) National Income and Expenditure 1960.
Table 80. * """"" •—
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allowance is merely a bringing forward of depreciation charges which
would otherwise be allowed in later years# It is therefore
analogous to a tax free loan from the Exchequer. The investment
allowances, on the other hand, are not taken into account in
calculating later allowances. It is given in addition to annual
and balancing allowances (or charges) which of themselves normally
amount to the full net cost. It is, therefore, in the nature of a
subsidy to new investment. Initial and investment allowances are
(87^
never both permitted on the same asset. '
The calculation of these allowances on the basis of original
cost of the assets, rather than current or replacement value,
creates an element of automatic flexibility in the corporate tax
system. In periods of inflation when the money values of assets
are rising, depreciation allowances remain at sb "unrealistically"
low level, and henoe taxable Income is to that extent greater.
Similarly, in depression, depreciation allowances remain higher
than market values would justify and hence taxable profits are
reduced. The effects of this method contrast sharply with replace¬
ment oost depreciation where the larger offset against profits in
inflation would reduce tax liabilities - the opposite to what
compensatory finance requires. The existence of initial allowances
mitigates this difference insofar as, during a price change, a
smaller fraction of the asset value on which the allowance is
calculated remains outstanding. Investment allowances, which have
(8?) For a description of Inland Eevenue allowances on capital
assets, see Sources and Methods, p. 330.
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no Influence ©n later deductions, do not have this effect.
The impact of aooelerated depreciation becomes more difficult
to appraise when the probable cyclical changes in investment are
introduced. If an inflationary situation is associated with a rise
and depression with a fall in fixed investment, high initial
depreciation allowances will reduce the cyclical variation in tax
yields. Much depends, however, on the extent that the allowances
permitted by the revenue authorities influence company accounting
and managerial decisions.
Another consideration of a similar nature is the method of
evaluating inventories. The revenue authorities in Britain do
not stipulate any particular system of stock evaluation but insist
merely that it be done on a reasonable and consistent basis. It is
olear, however, that where valuations follow the Fife basis, automatic
flexibility is greater.If prices fall during a recession,
reported profits and tax liabilities will fall more rapidly than in
the case of firms following the Lifo system.
A final consideration relates to the treatment of business losses,
and in particular the provisions for the carrying of losses through
(88) The Fifo, or fir3t-in-first-out method, means that goods are
valued at their price at the time they entered Inventory, and
assumes that goods are sold in the order of their acquisition.
This is the opposite of the Lifo or last-in-first-out method.
(89) On the other hand, although the liquidity position of firms
using the Lifo system will be more adversely affeoted during a
recession, their smaller decline in reported profits may help
prevent business pessimism and hence contribute to the stability
of investment.
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time. In Britain, losses may be carried forward and set off
against future profits without time restrictions. That is to say,
net losses must be set against the first available taxable profits,
but any loss balanoe oan be carried forward until it is absorbed.
This provision tends to restriot the built-in flexibility of the
tax by decreasing the variability of tax liabilities over the
business cyole. Past losses can be offset against profits in
periods of rising Inoome and hence tax liabilities reduoed at a time
( 91)
when compensatory finance would ordinarily require an increase.v '
These features modify the built-in flexibility resulting from
the proportional tax structure. Except for the minor exemptions
allowed for profits tax, corporate tax is levied on all net income.
This means that there is no tax base flexibility in the sense that
the proportion of oorporate income liable to tax changes over a
cyole. There is base flexibility, however, in the sense that
oorporate profits are a particularly volatile part of total income,
and the oorporate tax base is therefore highly sensitive to
economic fluctuations.
ihy tendency on the part of companies to maintain dividend
t
payments will also contribute to the flexibility of the corporate
(90) See H.A.R.W. Wilson, op. pit., pp. 288-289, also p. 505.
(91) The federal tax law in the United States, sinoe 1950, allows
a one-year carry baok of net operating losses but permits a
five-year carry forward. The carry forward was apparently
given preference beoause it avoids the administrative
difficulty of reopening old tax returns and beoause it is
relatively more advantageous to new and growing businesses.
(The carry baok favours established and declining business.)
Nevertheless, the emphasis on carry forward is undoubtedly
disadvantageous for the compensatory effects of the tax.
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tax base.^2^ Maintenance of dividends in depression years means
that a higher proportion of oorporate income is distributed, and
henoo less income tax will be payable by companies# It should be
noted, however, that any such tendency will adversely affeot the
liquidity of firms during the depression and, indeed, higher net
profits resulting from a tax reduction in such periods may
simply be used to stabilize dividend payments• Moreover, of the
higher proportion of profits distributed, the fraction saved can
be expected to be well above the marginal propensity to save of
(93)
the community as a whole.
The time lag between the earning of profits and the payment
of tax is considerable in the case of the income tax liabilities
of companies. As in the oase of business and professional
earnings in the personal sector, company income tax becomes
payable in the last quarter of the finanoial year in which the
assessment is made. The assessment is based on the profits earned
in the company's accounting period ending in the preceding financial
year. Thus the profits earned in the accounting year ending
in the 1959-60 finanoial year will be assessed at the rates (and
depreciation allowances) applicable in 1960-61, and the tax will
be paid in the last quarter of that year (i.e. after January
(92) Between 1949 and 1959# the annual increase in gross company
profits ranged from 20.29 per oent to minus 12.64 per cent,
while the annual increase in dividend payments on ordinary
and preference shares varied only from 12.36 per oent to
minus 2.56 per oent. Calculated from National Income and
Expenditure 1960. Table 25.
(93) This point is discussed by Richard Goode, "The Corporate
Income Tax in a Depression", Policies to Combat Depression.
PP* 149-170. See also his The Corporation Income Tux.
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1951, p. 108.
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1961).^^ There is, therefore, a maximum lag of two years between
the declaration of profit and the payment of tax thereon. 'When a
company's aooounting year ends late in the financial year, the lag
is closer to a single year.
The lag in profits tax payments is much shorter. Not only
is the tax assessed on the ourrent year's profit, hut it becomes
due and payable one month from the date of assessment.
The effeot of any time lag in delaying the tax effects on
spending behaviour is obviated to the extent that companies make
provisions for future tax payments by setting aside tax reserves out
of current income. The extent to which this practice is aotually
followed is not accurately ascertainable, but it can be expected to
( 95)
be the usual procedure. The Exchequer encourages the provision
for future tax liabilities by giving taxpayers the opportunity of
purchasing Tax Reserve Certificates. These Certificates, however,
(94) The aotual payment of tax may sometimes be held up for
administrative reasons or because of litigation; " .... but
on the average about 95 per oent of the income tax
collectable out of that assessed in any income tax year is
paid in the first calendar year." (i.e. the year following
the beginning of the last quarter of the financial year in
which the assessment was made). Sources and Methods, p. 166.
(95) " •••• it is generally held to be prudent accounting for a
company to guard against a reversal of fortune (when it might
have to pay a large amount of tax in a year of low profits)
by reserving enough to cover both the income tax chargeable
in respect of the ourrent year and also income tax chargeable
in respect of the assessment for the later year that will
normally be calculated on the amount of the ourrent year's
profit .... Hence, following the companies own practice ....
The total tax charge (tax payments plus additions to tax
reserves), which often varies widely from aotual payments
booause of changes both in the level of profits and in the
rates of tax, is for most purposes the appropriate figure to
deduot from gross profits for analysis of the trend of profits
after tax and of saving." Ibid, p. 150.
bear interest at only one and one-quarter per cent per annum for
eaoh month hold, but not exceeding twenty-four months. Tax Reserve
Certificates are purohased in considerable quantity* though it is
unlikely that they provide the major means whereby firms make
reserves for tax accruals. It is probable that businesses
find more profitable means of holding tax reserves.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the taxes on corporate
income are likely to show an important degree of built-in flexibility.
They are, first of all, a most Important source of public revenue
in terms of size. The tax base shows a high degree of cyclical
variability which is enhanced by the practice of original cost
depreciation and the tendency to maintain dividend distributions.
On the other hand, the provisions for loss carry forward provide at
least a potential moderating influence on base flexibility during
a period of rising profits. The proportional tax base shows no
inherent flexibility though its relatively high level ensures that
the Exchequer will absorb a large share of changes in profits. Pin-
ally, the common practioe of making provisions for tax liabilities
as they accrue eliminates, to a large extent at least, the effects
of time lags.
(96) The Treasury can provide no details regarding the nature of
Tax Reserve Certificate holdings. However, the value of Tax
Reserve Certificates outstanding at March 31st each year is
roughly one-third of annual corporate tax payments on income
(See Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics.
No. 97, 1960, H.M.S.O., London, October 1960, and
National Income and Expenditure 1960. Tables 292 and Table 3
respectively.) The amount of accrued tax at the end of the
fisoal year is not known, but in view of the lags in income
tax referred to above, it is likely to be considerably great¬
er than one-third of yearly income.
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Indirect Taxes
Taxes on expenditure account for more than one-third of central
(97)
government tax revenue. ' The indirect taxes of the United King¬
dom oonsist mainly of customs duties, excise duties, and the purchase
tax. The customs and excise duties form an integrated system;
customs duties usually being charged on imported goods if there is
an excise duty on similar goods of domestic manufacture.
Because of Britain's heavy dependence on imported supplies of
a number of basic commodities (for example tobaoco, petroleum), a
substantial amount of what in many other countries would take the
form of internal revenue is collected as customs duties. Custom
duties are therefore commonly sub-divided into two categories:
those whose primary function is to provide revenue ("revenue duties")
and those which exist mainly to give protection to United Kingdom
or Commonwealth producers ("proteotive duties"). for analytical
purposes, however, the distinction is not important and may be
disregarded.
The overwhelming share of customs and excise revenue arises from
the levies on a few groups of commodities; mainly tobacco, goods
taxable under purchase tax, alcoholic beverages and hydro-carbon
(97) In 1959* 39.12 per cent. Calculated from National Income and
Expenditure 1960. Table 35. ™
(98) for a description of the structure of indirect tax system
in the United Kingdom, see The British System of Taxation,
op. pit., Parts IV and V; and the annual Report(s) of the
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise, H.M.S.O.,
London.
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The purchase tax is distinct from the customs and excise duties
in that it is an ad valorem tax oolleoted at the wholesale level, and
applies to a wide range of consumer goods rather than to speoifio
items. It is, however, collected and administered by the Customs
and Excise Department and the reoeipts from it are regarded as part
of customs and excise revenue. Imported goods are liable to
purchase tax at the same rate as goods of British manufacture. The
tax was originally imposed (in 1940) in an effort to reduce
consumption so as to release resources for war purposes and to
provide emergency revenue. It is now regarded as essentially a
source of revenue. Its rates are a simple percentage of the -whole¬
sale value of the goods, and the tax normally becomes payable when
goods pass from a registered manufacturer or wholesaler to retailers
or oonsumers.
(99) In 1959-60, total customs and excise revenue was accounted for
by these groups in the following manner1
£ million % total
Tobaooo 788.5 34|
Purchase tax 501.5 22
Hydro-carbon oils 381.0 16J
Beer 218.9 jX
Wines and spirits 165.8 ?!
Protective duties 136.5 6
Other duties 90.4 4
Total 2,282.6 100
Prom 51st Report of the Commissioners of Iier Majesty's Customs
and Excise, for the year ended 31st March. 1960. H.M.S.O..
London, 1960 (henceforth 51st Report of H.M. Customs and Sxoise)
paragraphs 6 to 17.
(100) Unless otherwise noted, reference to customs and exoise revenue
will henoeforth be meant to include purchase tax reoeipts.
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The built-in flexibility of an indirect tax base oan take two
forms. The first relates to the inoome elastioity of demand for
the taxed goods. To the extent that the goods are inoome elastic,
more will be purchased in periods of rising incomes and henoe the
tax base expands. Conversely, in depression, purchases (and the
tax base) may be expected to contract. However, this flexibility
of the tax base will arise only if the change in money incomes is
not aocompanied by a change in prices of the same proportion. If
all prices rise together in equal proportion to an income increase
(or fall in proportion to an income decrease), real purchases cannot
be expected to change - except as a result of various possible money
illusions - and the tax base flexibility will not be manifested; If
a price change does not occur, or is proportionally smaller than the
ohange in inoome, base flexibility will be positive whenever there
is a positive correlation between income and purchases of the taxed
commodities, and will be negative only in the ease of inferior goods.
In the oase of ad valorem taxes a second cause of base flexi¬
bility is introduced when prices are sensitive to income fluctuations.
For these taxes the tax base is not the goods themselves but their
money value. Henoe, when the prices are rising, the ad valorem tax
base expands and vloe versa during a decline. This type of base
flexibility dearly exists for the purchase tax but not for other
customs and excise duties.
Rate flexibility will be neutral (ty definition) for any
ad valorem tax. However, in the oase of excises or any taxes with
fixed money rates the rate flexibility will be neutral only as long
as the price of the goods remains constant. If commodity prices
change over a business cycle then rate flexibility beoomes perverse.
As long as the money charge is fixed then the tax rate effectively
increases when prices fall and is eroded away when prioes rise.
Apart from the purchase tax, therefore, customs and excise
duties will show, if anything, a negative rate flexibility. Base
flexibility will be positive to the extent that the tax falls on
commodities with a positive inoome elasticity of demand, and when
the change in money incomes is greater than the change in prioes.
The purchase tax yield can be expected to show considerably
greater compensating variability. Since the tax is an ad valorem
leuy, rate flexibility will be zero. Base flexibility, however,
will probably be high for a number of reasons. Firstly, any change
in wholesale money value of goods on whioh the tax is levied will
broaden the base on which the rate is applied. Secondly, the tax
is explicitly levied on goods with a high inoome elasticity of demand.
Finally, the tax is designed to apply at higher rate3 on goods whioh
are more "luxurious" in nature and which therefore almost certainly
show a higher income elasticity of demand.^^
Specific duties will therefore show less sensitivity than those
which are levied ad valorem, beoause their yield will not fluctuate
part passu with price changes. Against this, however, it is
neoessaxy to consider that a fixed charge on a commodity means that
(101) See 51st Report of H.LI. Customs and Excise, pp. 101-2.
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its market prioe will show a smaller variation in response to
producer's price fluctuations than in the oase of an ad valorem rate.
As a result, in the oase of commodities for which demand is very
elastic, substitution and real inoome effeots may produce a
relatively high degree of yield sensitivity.
Furthermore, some broad generalizations might be made regard¬
ing the type of goods taxed. Sinoe final consumption usually
varies less than the whole of national expenditure, it may be
expeoted that taxes on goods for final consumption, and the materials
used in their manufacture, will show less yield variability than
taxes on investment goodsThe yield of taxes levied on goods
(102) R.F. Bretherton, in probably the earliest empirical study of
tax sensitivity, "The Sensitivity of Taxes to Fluctuations of
Trade", Eoonometrica. Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1937, pp. 171-183,
shows that during the period 1921 to 1935 the yield from the
principal excises, namely tobaoco duties, sugar and molasses
duties, boor duties, and spirit duties showed low sensitivity
to trade fluctuations (but marked secular trends in some
oases). Measuring cyclical sensitivity as the ratio of the
percentage change in tax yields (corrected for changes in
rates during the period) to the peroentage change in national
("social") inoome, the sensitivity of these excises proved
The sensitivity of this group is markedly lower than for
the other main sources of revenue. It must be remembered of
course that the structure of taxation has changed greatly
since these calculations were made, though the changes in
these excises are probably less fundamental than in the












for wfaioh there is an increasing secular demand will probably show a
low sensitivity to a fall in income and a high sensitivity to
reooveiy while the opposite will tend to be the case with goods for
which there is a secular decline in demand. Finally, insofar as
the world prices of imports fluctuate more than those of domestic
products, the yield from import duties will vary more than the
yield from excises.
The impaot of indirect tax flexibility is unlikely to involve
axy significant time lag. Customs and excise charges are incurred
by the consumer at the time of purchase, so that even if the
Exchequer'3 reooipt of the revenue involves a delay, the impact on
consumers' spending behaviour is likely to be immediate. In th©
case of purchase tax, the revenue is collected quarterly and th®
receipts during each quarter relate to sales and appropriations
by registered traders during the preceding quarter.^
Other duties and taxes
The remaining taxes on expenditure, namely stamp duties, broad¬
cast and motor vehicle licences, and the taxes on entertainments
and betting, are of less interest because of their small relative
size in terms of revenue. Motor vehicle licences, the largest
single item, aocount for less than two per cent of total central
government tax revenue This duty is fixed at a flat rate
(103) See 51st Report of H.M. Customs and Excise, p. 101.
(104) i.e. 1.72 per oent in 1959, National Income and Expenditure.
1960. Table 35• The increase in motor vehicles duties
proposed in the 1961 budget is expected to increase the
revenue from this item by one quarters Finanoial Statement
(1961-62), Table XI. ~ '
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regardless of the value of the vehicle and hence represents a
regressive rate structure. Like exeise taxes, motor vehicle licenoes
will show, if anything, negative rate flexibility. Base flexibility
will be positive insofar as motor vehioles show a positive income
elasticity of demand and automobile price changes are smaller than
income changes. There is virtually no lag involved in the impact
of the behavioural effects of the duty except that the number of
vehicle owners in the short run is likely to be hi^ily inelastic,
so that aiy tax-induced adjustment in car ownership may take some
time to materialise. Motor vehicles provide a classic example of
a commodity for which there is a secular increase in demand, and hence
the yield of the motor vehicle duty can be expected to show a high
sensitivity to rising income and a low sensitivity to depression.
The only other taxes of any importance are death duties and local
authority rates. Death duties (of which only the estate duty is
chargeable in connection with deaths occurring at the present time)
account for between three and four per cent of central government
tax receipts.it is levied on estates with a net capital of
over three thousand pounds and is charged at progressive rates which
rise to eighty per cent on estates valued at more than two million
(105) Oils is borne out in Brethertoa's study (op. pit.) where (at a
time when the automobile market was in an early stage of
development) expanding demand almost obscured the effects of
the depression. His sensitivity index for motor vehicle duties
was 6.63 during the upswing, 0.18 during the downswing, and
2.48 to re00very.
(106; In 1959, 3*34 per eent. National Income and Expenditure 1960.
Table 35. An insignificant proportion of these receipts is
accountable to death duties other than the estate duty which
have since been abolished.
(107) For details of the rate structure, see 103rd Inland Revenue
Report, pp. 105-129.
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The yield from death duties will show flexibility the extent
that changes in the value of money over a cycle cause corresponding
changes in the valuations of property. During a period of rising
money values, estates will beoome liable at higher rates. Moreover,
fewer estates will fall below the exemption limit. The reverse
base and rate flexibility will oocur in periods of declining money
values.
The value of estates will tend to fluctuate closely with the
security market sinoe a large share of taxable estates consists
of government and private securities and company shares. Moreover,
the prioes of such securities tend to fluctuate much sore than
the national income. It is also clear that the owners of very
large estates tend to hold a greater proportion of their wealth
in the form of industrial equities whose prioes are more sensitive
than government bonds or real property/10^
Death duties are likely, therefore, to show a high sensitivity
to cyclical changes, even though the number of estates which beoome
liable to tax (i.e. the number of deaths) is unlikely to show azy
cyolioal response. The stabilizing impact of this flexibility,
however, is likely to be veiy limited. In the first place the tax
is paid out of non-reourrent income and henoe is likely to have a
small effeot on spending behaviour. Secondly, the fiscal
efficiency of the tax is undoubtedly low since the beneficiaries
of valuable legacies tend to have a high propensity to save.
Finally, the impact on spending behaviour is restricted by the
(108) For an analysis of the form of taxable estates, see 103rd
Inland Revenue Report. Table 109.
- 94 -
highly illiquid form in which mary inheritances are received.
Local rates are of less interest from a compensatory point
(109)
of view in spite of their importance as a source of revenue.
To begin with, they accrue to local governments who are not
directly concerned with fiscal policy and hence any ceteris paribus
assumption about revenue changes is likely to be highly unreslistio.
Bates exist purely for revenue purposes and henoe tend to be
inflexible, particularly in the downward direction.
Rates are set on a proportional basis so that rate flexibility
tends to be neutral. In any event, the rate is set annually so
that automatic flexibility is of limited significance. Base
flexibility arising out of income elasticity of demand for housing
is highly uncertain since the housing market is influenced by
strong independent pressures j such as government housing policies
and rent controls. Finally, base flexibility arising from the
swings in assessed values in sympathy with cyclical fluctuations is
largely eliminated by the administrative policy of epplying out-of-
date valuations. For these reasons local rates cannot be expected
to have any great stabilizing influence.
Clearly, the most significant built-in flexibility on the
revenue side of the budget arises out of the direct taxes on personal
and corporate incomes and certain of the customs and exoise duties.
The other sources of revenue can have little compensatory influence
(109) In 1959, revenue from rates amounted to 39.47 per cent of
local authority current revenue. National Income and Exoencl-
iturc 1960. Table 39. In terms of relative size, it was the
third largest single source of tax income (after income tax
and tobacco duly).
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either because they tend to have a limited impact on spending
behaviour or beoause they are too small to exert a significant
fisoal impaot.
2. Expenditure Adjustments: Unemployment Benefits
On the expenditure side of the budget, there are fewer items
wfoioh are likely to show an automatic flexibility in response to
eoonomio fluctuations. There are, of course, a number of heads
whioh would probably be expanded in times of depression, such as
public works spending and grants to local authorities and
nationalised (or other) industries, but such changes would require
approval and are not, therefore, automatic. Even agricultural
subsidies, being fixed in money terms, would not automatically
cause an expansion in publio payments.
Similarly, most of the important transfer expenditures -
family allowances, sickness and injury benefits, retirements
pensions, and widows and maturity benefits - oan hardly respond to
cyclical fluctuations. Only unemployment benefit payments are
certain to show a predictable compensating movement.^11^
The statutory provisions for payments to the unemployed ensure
that this form of transfer outlay must automatically expand during
a period of recession, and these payments will permit the recipients
(llO) The fall in purchasing power of the unemployed during a
recession may be mitigated by tax rebates also. P.A.Y.E.
tax payments depend on the individual's coding number whioh
is based on an estimate of inoorae in the tax year (in faot it
is based on the amount of the previous year's income). If
there is a sudden reoession and earnings fall below the
expeoted monthly average, the employed person is entitled to
a tax rebate, and this is usually paid without delay.
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to maintain a minimum level of consumption spending and therefore
soften the fall in demand. However, two qualifications apply to
the stabilizing action of unemployment benefits. Firstly, they
are sensitive to the level of employment, not inoome, and so any
generalization about their compensatory effect on income fluctuations
must subsume some dirsot correlation between inoome and the level of
employment. Secondly, they are sensitive to downswings only, since
after a certain level of employment is attained they will show no
further compensating deorease in payments during inflation.^111^
Except in severe depressions, the impact of of unemployment
benefit flexibility is limited because of the relatively small size
of these payments in the governmental current acoount.^The
(111) The 1%1 Budget inoluded a proposal to enable the Treasury to
impose a surcharge on employers in the nature of a payroll
tax. The proposal was aimed at providing the Treasury with
temporary power to tax employers when the pressure on employ¬
ment demands such fiscal aotlon. It should be noted that
the proposed tax is not really a tax on payrolls as suoh but
on employment. If used, this tax would represent an addit¬
ion to the employers' share of national insurance contribut¬
ions, and, from a fiscal point of view, a compltoent to the
unemployment benefit in times of exoess demand. However,
liability to this tax would be at the discretion of the
Treasury and cannot, therefore, be considered automatic.
See the Financial Statement (1961-62). p. 23« For a force¬
ful ©ritioism of the payroll tax as an anti-inflationary
devioe, see E.J. Mishan, "The Emperor's New Clothes: the
Payroll Tax Stripped Bare", The Bankers' Magazine. No. 1^08,
July 1961, pp. 17-22. Mishan argues, among other things,
that if the payroll tax is successful in its aim. to induoe
economy in labour employment by switching to more effioient
(capital intensive) methods, the higher expenditure on
investment will inorease demand enough to offset the
contractionary effects of reduced pressure on the labour
market.
(112) The level of unemployment benefits vary considerably but in
1958, a recession year in which the share of these payments
in current expenditure was highest for the deoade slnoe
1949» they aocounted for 0.82(5) per oent of ourrent central
government expenditure on goods and services and transfers.
National Inoome and Expenditure 1960, Tables 35 and 38.
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unemployment benefit system now in foroe provides weekly allowances
to unemployed persons aocording to their marital status and number
of dependents but bearing no relation to the income normally earnedJ
Thus if it is reasonable to assume a straight line relationship
between inoosae and employment below the full employment level, the
system will show a proportional base flexibility. Sinoe the
benefits are uniform and fixed, there will be no rate flexibility.
To the extent that the assumption regarding the relationship
between income and employment is valid, unemployment benefits can
be regarded as negative taxes on persons who involuntarily earn no
income, and for analytical purposes, can therefore be treated in the
3» Measures to Strengthen Built-in Flexibility
The built-in flexibility of the tax and transfer systems could
be strengthened in a number of ways. Any changes in pursuit of
greater flexibility would, however, almost certainly have reper¬
cussions on other policy objectives and henoe may not be warranted.
Nevertheless, in view of the fairly frequent references in the
literature to the advisability of greater reliance on non-disoretion-
ary controls, it may be considered appropriate in the present context
to outline briefly the direction in which any such changes would
have to be made.^11^
(113) For an outline of benefit rates, see Report of the Ministry of
Pensions and National Insurance 1959, Table 29.
(114) See ©specially G.L. Bach's "Monetary - Fiscal Policy Reconsider**
od"» Journal of Political Eoonomy. Vol. LVII, October 1949, pp.
383-394; Mlton Friedman, "A Monetary and Fiscal Framework in
Economic Stability", op. pit.; Albert C. Hart, "Timing and
Administering Fiscal Policy: How to Give Relevant Council",
American Eoonomlo Review. Vol. 38, May 1948, pp. 430-448; and
Taxes, National Security, and Economic Growth. A Report by the
Committee for Economic Development, Mew York, 1954* p*10 et 300.
same way as a direot tax on personal income.
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Clearly, the limits to built-in flexibility of the various
taxes are set by their ©overage, their marginal rates, and their
promptness of impact. Automatic flexibility would be "perfect"
only if all income increases (or deoreaaes) were liable to a
marginal tax (or benefit) rate of one hundred per cent without
time lag. However, various modifications of the present frame¬
work would increase the existing sensitivity of the financial
struoture.
First of all, any broadening of the tax base would, oeteris
paribus, increase the variability of tax yield and hence also the
autoaatio fiscal effect, This could be accomplished by various
measures. The tax base of the personal income tax could be
widened by reducing exemption limits and including capital gains
as inoome. This latter represents a particularly volatile source
of inoome which, ipso facto, would contribute a disproportionate
increase in sensitivity to the direot tax on personal incomes. The
soope of indirect taxes might be increased by including a wider
range of consumer goods, servioes, and (especially) investment goods.
The higher the effective rate of tax the greater the flexi¬
bility of tax yield. Thus an increase in the average rate of ary
tax - direot or indirect - will inorease the regulatory effect of
the system. By the same token, an inorease in the rate of unemploy¬
ment benefit will inorease flexibility during a downswing.
Flexibility oan also be strengthened by steepening the rate
struoture of ary tax. A more sharply graduated schedule of marginal
rates applicable to personal incomes (without neoessarily increasing
the average rate) would inorease the variations in tax yield.
A similar result would be achieved by charging national insuranoe
contributions at a proportional or even a progressive rate on
earnings. A graduated schedule applicable to corporate incomes
or any inorease in loss offsets without time time lag, would have
a similar effeot, buttressed by the fact that company profits are
particularly sensitive to the level of eoonomio aotivity.
Progressivity can be applied to indireot taxes by relating the
tax rate to the income elasticity of demand for the taxed
commodities.
Any measure which relates taxes or benefits more olosely to
the level of income strengthens their compensating effeot. Thus
a payroll tax rate may be designed to vary in response to some
formula relating to the level of employment, or, even more effective¬
ly, to the level of earnings. If agricultural subsidies, instead
of being granted in the form of fixed gratuities (i.e. "excise"
subsidies), were related to a moving price differential, the
variability in outlay would have a distinct regulatory effect (as
long as the agricultural prices varied with those of the rest of
the eoonony). A similar effeot would result if investment and
initial allowances ?/ere inversely related to company profits.
(115) Incidentally, the excess profits levy, which was in fcroe
from January 1952, to December 1953» and consisted of a
30 per cent charge against the amount by which the company's
profits exceeded its "standard" (historical average) profits
increased the yield flexibility of profits taxes by raising
the marginal rate chargeable during a period of business
prosperity*
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Time lags could be reduced by extending the witholding
(P.A.Y.E.) system, by assessing current earnings rather than those
of some past period, or by giving inoreased incentives for providing
tax aooruals. Among taxes on personal incomes the surtax system,
particularly, suffers a serious (and perhaps unnecessary) time lag.
On company inoome charges the delay might be reduced not only
between earnings and assessment but also between assessment and
payment. The inoentive for setting aside tax reserves
against future obligations, thereby minimising the effect of time
lags, might be increased by offering higher interest on Tax Reserve
Certificates.
Finally, certain generalizations can be made about the relative
advantages of some forms of tax from the point of view of automatic
flexibility. If it is aooepted that inoome fluctuates more widely
over a cycle than does consumption, then an inoome tax will show
more variation in yield than an indireot tax system of the same
progressivity. Among indireot taxes, ad valorem charges such as
the purchase tax are clearly preferable to flat rate excises.
Beoause of its shorter lag, a heavier dependence on the profits tax
rather than the income tax on company incomes would inoraa.se
sensitivity.
In short, aiy measure that would broaden the tax base, increase
the effective tax rate, steepen the marginal rate structure, or
reduoe time lags in payment would increase built-in flexibility and
(116) In the United States, oorporate taxes are paid in two equal
instalments in the first half of the year following assess¬
ment. See Riohard Goode, "The Corporate Income Tax in a
Depression", op. oit*
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henoo also the compensatory effeet of the flseal system#
k. Autoaatio De-atabiliging Forces
In contrast to the devices described above there are a number
of Influenoes in tire eoonosy whioh tend to aggravate rather than
mitigate eoonomio fluctuations. Most of these are not primarily
fisoal in nature, and they tend to arise out of illusions of
various kinds. Nevertheless, they deserve at least a brief mention
in the present disoussion.
Probably the most powerful influenoe arises in the money and
oredit system. In a period of increasing business activity and
rising incomes and prioes, the demand for oredit for the finanoing
of business and consumer buying tends to increase. At the same time,
risks appear more favourable during a period of business optimism and
oredit facilities are extended to their limit. A reoession, on th®
other hand, usually stimulates the desire to hold idle balances and
leads to caution on the part of lenders. The result is an exagger¬
ated expansion of consumption in prosperity and contraction in
reoession.
The banking system's policy of maintaining a certain proportion
of assets in liquid form reinforoea this effeot, since when the
oommunity dhooses to hold more money in the form of deposits, as may
be expeoted during a period of rising incomes, the total available
stock of money increases. In a reoession, oaution cay well induce
banks to inorease their reserves in relation to their liabilities,
thereby forcing a oontraotion in deposits. Expansions and contractions
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in bank oredit are clearly to some extent a reflection of business
fluctuations; but they almost certainly serve to increase the ampli¬
tude of these fluctuations*^11^
The debt policy of the government will also show a tendency to
oonfliot with compensatory measures# A budget deficit in depression
entails government sales of securities at a time when the central
bank may well be tlying to reduce interest rates in order to
stimulate recovery#
Pressure almost inevitably arises for perverse fiscal adjust¬
ments over the oourse of a cycle. During a depression the government
is pressed to reduce spending when the burden of inoreased expenditure
is exaggerated by reduoed revenues. In periods of prosperity fiscal
arguments for a reduction in public spending often appear weak in
the eyes of the publio when the government's financial capability
of providing public facilities is increasing.
Finally, the accelerator hypothesis suggests that in addition
to the direct effects of businessmens* expectations on investment,
there is an automatic tendency for investment to expand at an increas¬
ingly high rate during periods of rising production and demand.
(117) It is therefore changes In the stock of available money that
tend to cause the banking system to aggravate fluctuations.
If the quantity of money was held constant, the monetary
system might provide a stabilizing influence, sinoe as the
demand for cash increased in prosperity, interest rates would
tend to move in a compensating direction. Similarly if
prices changed, real wealth would change in the opposite
direction, and this might influenoe spending in a compensat¬
ory way. On the other hand, if changes in the stook of money
reflected budget deficits or surplusses (as suggested by
Friedman in f,A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic
Stability", op. oit.) the above two effects would be
reinforced.
103
Conversely, investment tends to fall off when demand oeases to
rise* The existence of initial and investment allowances will
aggravate this situation toy providing larger offsets against
profits when income is rising and smaller offsets (i.e. proport¬
ionately greater tax liability) in recession. Such a tendency
is in direct oonfliot with the otojeotives of fiscal control.
CHAPTER IV
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BUILT-IN
FLEXIBILITY AND ITS STABILIZING EFFECT
"While such has been said in reoent years about
the growing strength of built-in stabilisers,
these remain to be tested."
(Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance)
The nature of automatic flexibility and the fiscal devices
which give rise to it were examined on the previous pages. It is
the purpose of this section to develop a theoretical framework
within which a measurement of built-in flexibility and its impact
on economic stability can be represented. Thus equipped with a
r
methodological approach to the problem, an empirical quantification
of automatic flexibility and its compensatory effect will be
attempted in the following chapter.
The oontext of the eoonomio relationships in this and the
following seotions will be one of a simple model of a static eoonony.
The conclusions regarding the compensatory effects of fiscal
changes will apply therefore to fluctuations of a structural or
non-self-oorreoting nature, cyclical movements, and to short-run
fluctuations around a growth trend.
The approach adopted consists in representing the relevant
changes in a relatively simple statio model which does not take
explicit account of time. In addition, as is usual with such
models, it is implicitly assumed that a change in investment
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spending has no effect on the level of real income. Since, for |.
reasons given earlier, the main oonoern in this context is in the
short period in any event, this latter simplification is not
unrealistic.
It must be emphasized that the model adopted is only one of a
wide variety of possibilities? and that the particular relationships
chosen have important implications for the results arrived at. The
model constructed here is specifically designed to concentrate on the
effeots of direot tax changes.
1. A Measure of Built-in Flexibility
The first requirement is to postulate an appropriate form in
whioh automatic flexibility can be quantitatively represented. For
the purpose of measuring fisoal impact, the most informative measure
for short run analysis is one that indicates the absolute change in
tax yield (or benefit payments) associated with a given change in
(118)
income.v ' This may be expressed as:
(118) Various other expressions of built-in flexibility have been
suggested. William Vickery defines built-in flexibility
as the ratio of tax yield in prosperity to the yield in
depression: "The Effect of Averaging on the Qyolioal
Sensitivity of the Yield of the Income Tax," Journal of
."olitioal Economy. Vol. LIII, No. 3, September 1945,
pp. 275-276. rTa. Musgrave and M.H. Miller use an elasticity
measure, viz. the ratio of the percentage change in tax yield
to the associated percentage change in income: "Built-in
Flexibility," American Economic Review. Vol. 38, No. 1, Liaroh
1948, pp. 122-128; reprinted in Readings in Fiscal Policy.
American Economio Association, Illinois, 1955- A 00raparable
measure is that derived by Richard E. Slitor in "The Measure¬
ment of Progressivity and Built-in Flexibility", Quarterly
Journal of Eoonomlcs. February 1948, PP. 309-313,
(cont'd p. 106)
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where z\T = the change in tax yield associated with aY, and
Y » the change in income. Thus m is the ratio of the increase
in tax yield to its causal change in income, or the marginal
rate of tax.^1^
If the tax yield does not change in response to income
variations, ® = 0, and there is no built-in flexibility in the
(118) (cont'd)
who designates flexibility in terms of the ratio of the
marginal rate of tax to the effective (average) rate. A
measure relating the actual absolute ohange in tax yield to
its oausal ohange in income, similar to that used here, was
adopted by M.O. Clement, Review of Economics and Statistics.
February 1960, pp. 56-61j and by Joseph A. Pechman, "Yield
of the Individual Income Tax During a Recession", in
Folioies to Combat Depression, pp. 123-146. Leo Cohen, in
an elaboration of Peehaan's analysis, also justifies the
use of this approach: "An Empirical Measurement of the
Built-in Flexibility of the Individual Inoome Tax", American
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), Vol. XLIX, key
1949, pp. 532-541 (see his footnote on p. 532).
The formulation of built-in flexibility in terms of the ratio
of the elasticity of tax yield to that of income change at a
given point is well suited to the measurement of the
sensitivity of tax liability to changes in income and it is
undoubtedly the superior measure for analysing and comparing
the properties of given tax sohedules. However, the marginal
yield approach followed here, which focuses attention on
actual tax yield changes in response to income variations,
is more appropriate for estimating the regulatory effeots of
the tax system since the value of flexibility does not depend
upon the original tax and inoome levels.
(119) The term marginal rate of tax as used here is not to be
oonfused with the statutory marginal tax rate. The former
relates to the effective rate on changes in total inoome, where¬
as the latter refers to the rate applicable to changes in
taxable income falling under a specific rate schedule.
Moreover, it is important to note the difference between this
measure of built-in flexibility and tax yield elasticity.




system. If m « 1, tax yields show perfect flexibility and any
increase in income is completely taxed awEy</1t"C^
2. A Measure of Stabilizing Effectiveness
Equation 1 provides an indication of the sensitivity of tax
yields to any ohange in inoome. It does not, however, show the
extent that income is stabilized as a result of this sensitivity
in the tax system.^21^ For this purpose, another expression is
required which can be formulated asi
(120) It is theoretically possible, though highly Improbable in
practice, for the marginal rate of tax to exceed dnlty.
(121) A number of writers, including Pechman and Cohen (op.
seem to mistakenly identify built-in flexibility with
stabilizing effeqtiveness. The latter, whose " .... basic
purpose .... is to measure and analyse the quantitative
importance of the individual inoome tax as a built-in
stabilizer ....", restriots his study to tax yield
flexibility. The automatic change in tax yield resulting
from an inoome change shows only the initial or first-round
impaot, and olearly ignores the multiplier effects of the
tax change operating through the spending propensities on
successive rounds of responding.
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2 = 1- " aY
AY,J
where aY a the change in income that occurs in the system
under study
and aYJ » the change in income that would ooour if tax yields
were completely insensitive to income changes (no
built-in flexibility).
Henoe Z * the fraction of the potential change in income
( aYj) which is prevented by built-in
flexibility/122^
(122) This formulation of stabilizing effectiveness is similar to
that developed by Musgrave and Miller, op. cit», and used by
Musgrave in his The Theory of Public Finanoe. op. pit.,
pp. 508-509. David W. Lusher, "The Stabilizing Effective¬
ness of Budget Flexibility", in Policies to Combat
Depression, pp. 77*89, makes use of a comparable expression
(i.e. his -s -IS ) which, in the denotations adopted above,
Y1 " Y12
can be expressed ass
AYJ ( 1 AYj )
In Lusher*s case, however, the no-flexibility condition is
given by assuming a constant effective tax rate whereas
Musgrave*s definition of zero flexibility and that adopted
here involves a fixed level of tax yield. The relation
between the two approaches is shown in an appendix to
Lusher's artiole. See also the comments on Lusher*s
coefficient by A.&. Hart and Melvin I. ¥hite, Ibid.. pp. 106-
114.
Cary Brown (op. pit.) measures stabilizing impaot as the
difference between the multiplier in the case under study and
that which would obtain with tax yields fixedJ
i.e. where a A is the oausal autonomous shift
a A A A
in demand.
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Equation 1 provides a general representation of the magnitude
of built-in flexibility. Equation 2 provides a measure of
stabilizing effectiveness. It remains to show the precise
relationship between tax flexibility and automatio stabilization.
For this purpose it will be helpful to begin with a simple
Eeynesian-type expenditure equation where changes in the level of
income initiated by some autonomous change in spending can be
represented, i.e.
■A, Y a a. A + A. C + AI ........... 3
where aY as the ohange in aggregate income, which is
defined as the sum of the inoome of the personal
seotor before tax and undistributed profits of
the corporate seotor before tax
aA = an autonomous ohange in spending by persons,
oorporat® bodies, or government
aC = the ohange in expenditure of persons on goods
and services
and aI » the ohange in net investment by corporate bodies.
The expenditure of the publio seotor does not enter into this formu¬
lation in view of the definition of aggregate inoome and beoause,
for present purposes, publio spending is assumed to be held constant.
It is assumed, therefore, that changes oan occur in either of
the two seotors in this simplified model. Looking at the model from
the inoome aspect, aggregate inoome oan be represented:
11C *
aY » AYP + ASb 4
where aYp » the ohange in personal income before tax
and ASb = the change in corporate savings before tax.
If the change in undistributed profits is related to the ohange in
aggregate income, then
ASb « vAY
and the ohange in personal incomes can be expressed
aYp « aY(1 - v)
3» The impaot of personal inoome tax yield flexibility
The above disaggregation enables an examination of the flexi¬
bility of taxes on the personal sector and its effect on consumption
spending in isolation from the foroes at work in the corporate
seotor. Thus equation 1 can be modified to represent the auto¬
matic flexibility of taxes on personal income.
m* =
a Yp
where aTp = the ohange in yield of taxes on personal
incomes associated with AYp
and aYP = the ohange in personal incomes.
Thus m* a the built-in flexibility of personal income
taxes (or the marginal rate of tax on
personal income).
Following the usual prooedure, the change in consumption
associated with a ohange in income is defined as a function of the
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change in personal inoome after tax, i.e.
= ^Y - ▼ Y • a' (^Y - v^Y)
a o^Y(1 * v)(l - m') ...... 5
where o = the marginal propensity to oonsume out of
personal income after tax* *
Equation 5 oan now he substituted into equation 3» for the
time being, investment is considered autonomous, and since it
therefore shows no response to other forms of spending it
disappears from the equation. Equation 3 thus beoomes
^Y * - o^Y(l » v)(1 » m*)
"
1 - .(1 - «•) 6
which indicates the ohange in income initiated by some autonomous
change in spending when only consumption is affeoted and when the
tax yield on personal inoome is sensitive to inoome fluctuations.
If, however, the tax yield was completely insensitive to
inoome ohange, then m' = 0, and the resulting ohange in consumption
(equation 3) oould be expressed simply as
aCJ « o ^Y3(1 - ▼) 7
where ^Yj and ^ Cj represent the ohange in aggregate inoome
and consumption respectively when the tax yield is inflexible.
Thus the ohange in aggregate inoome where tax yields are fixed can
be expressed by simplifying equation 6 to
'"■l-,1la- t) 8
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Equations 6 and 8 express the change in aggregate inoome
when tax yields are flexible and inflexible respectively. These
oan now be substituted into equation 2 to give a measure of the
stabilizing effectiveness of personal inoome tax yield flexi¬
bility.
©lis representation points up important implications not only
of tax yield sensitivity but also of this form of simple aggregate
eoonomio model. First of all, as long as m* is positive, so that
tax yields are positively sensitive to inoome changes (equation 6),
the ohange in aggregate lnoome will be less than where they are
inflexible (equation 8). This follows because
1 - o(l - v)(1 - m') > om'(l - v) as long as o(l - v) is less than
unity; and so ^ Y c^Yj. The change in tax yield will be the
same regardless of the souroe of the initial (autonomous) ohange
in spending.
For all intents and purposes, it is impossible for the marginal
tax rate to exceed 100 per oent (or a = 1), in which oase the increase
in inoome would be matched by an equal increase in tax yields (i.e.
aT = aY). The upper limit of Z is therefore equal to o(1 - v),
and complete stabilization is impossible as long as the marginal
propensity to oonsume is less than one or oorporate savings are
positive.




If o and v are known, aquation 9 provides the relationship
between the built-in flexibility of the tax system and the extent to
whioh fluctuations in incomes are prevented thereby. Figure 1
indicates that if both these coefficients were constant, the
relationship would take the form of a hyperbola, showing that
suooessive increments of built-in flexibility have a decreasing
impact on stabilizing effectiveness. The yield flexibility of the
personal income tax and hence also its stabilizing effeot, will be
greater the higher the value of o and the lower the value for v.
Regardless of the value for o and v, if m * 0, meaning that
the tax system is completely insensitive to income changes, then
Z = 0 also (sinoe » ^Y,j). If m is negative Z also beooses
negative and the system is then destabilizing so that any
swing in income will be aggravated ty tax yield flexibility.
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Figure 11 The relationship between the built-in flexibility
of taxes on personal incomes and its
stabilising effectiveness.
The impaot of oorporate tax yield flexibility
The construction of a formulation to show up the implications
of yield flexibility of a tax on undistributed profits can be
aooomplished more quiokly, sinoe it follows the same pattern as
that outlined for taxes in the personal sector* The flexibility




where a Tb = the change in yield of the tax on corporate
sayings,
and vaY m ASb, or the share of aggregate income
change absorbed by corporate savings.
Henoe s" = the marginal rate of tax on oorporate savings,
or the built-in flexibility of the oorporate
tax.
Assuming that corporate net investment is a function of
undistributed corporate profits after tax, a change in investment
can be represented
a! = iv * Y(1 - mM) 11
where i » the marginal propensity of oorporate bodies
to invest net savings.
Isolating the effeot of tax changes on investment by holding
consumption constant, equation 3 beoomes
a Y = aA + iv aY(1 - b")
^ A
■
1 - 1.(1 - m") 12
If, on the other hand, the oorporate tax yield was insensitive
to income changes, then mn = 0, end equation 11 oould be rewritten
aIJ = iv a Yj 13
(122) It would make no difference to this part of the theory if
investment was related to net retained profits of some
earlier period.
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end equation 12 becomes
~A
^I3
Substituting equations 12 and 14 into equation 2
Z(.f ■•) . 1 - V _ irff- »") 1 - iv^ A
ivm"
15* 1 • mw)
Where Z (of m") represents the fraction of income change
prevented by the tax on oorporate savings*
Again, if the upper limit of the marginal rate of tax is 100 per
oent (i.e. mw a 1), the maximum possible value of Z (of mN) is equal
to iv, and stabilization oan never be complete as long as iv < 1.
If m" a 0, then Z (of m") is also neutral} if a** <0, then the tax
is destabilizing. The yield flexibility and stabilizing effect
of the undistributed profits tax will be greater the higher the values
of i and v.
Combined effeot of personal income and undistributed profits tax
yield flexibility
It should be noted that the equations for Z (of m*) and Z (of m")
are not additive. Thus equation 3 oust now be considered in its
entirety to show the effeot on aggregate income change of both
personal and oorporate tax sensitivity, i.e.
Substituting equations 5 and 11 into this equation gives a
representation of the change in aggregate income in the presenoe
of both personal and oorporate tax flexibility*
^Y a ^ A + ^ I
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\ Y a a a * e aY(1 - v)(1 - m1) +ir ay(1 - i»)
"
1 - o(l * v)(l - n') - iv(l - m") 16
The condition of no flexibility in the tax yield is represented
by introducing equations 7 and 13 into equation 3* Thus
AYj e aa + e AY^(1 - v) + iv AYj
A A 4
-
1 - 0{1 - t) - i* 17
The fraction of potential income change prevented by
flexibility in the tax system (the measure of stabilizing effective¬
ness) for both sectors, is therefore
„/ ^ A A * 1 - c(1 * v) * ivz(of »• ♦ «•) . 1 . ^ . T)(1 . a.) . 1T(1 .
a cm' (1 - v) ♦ »"iv .R
1 - o(1 - v)(1 - a*} • iv(l - a"5)"
Some final conclusions can be drawn from equation 18. If the
maximum marginal rates of tax on both personal income and undistributed
profits is 100 per oent (i.e. a* + ra" = 2), then the upper limit to
the fraction of potential income change prevented by tax flexibility
is equal to c(1 - v) + iv. Stabilization ©an never be complete
as long as c and i are both less than unity. Moreover, suppose
m" > a'. If o and i were equal, then stabilization would be
greater the larger the value of v. If a' > a", stabilization would
be inversely related to v. Finally, if a* a a", and o > i,
stabilization will be greater the lower the value of v.
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As does most eoonomio theory, the above system of relationships
leaves itself open to orltioism through over-simplification. Hie
equations dealing with ohanges in the personal seotor are
relatively- reliable since they involve only well-aooepted proposit¬
ions pertaining to the relations between disposable income and
consumption spending* Nevertheless, no explicit account is taken
of possible (or probable) shifts in the distribution of inoomes or
in the propensity to spend* There is more room for oritleism in
the approach to adjustments in the corporate seotor, especially in
the assumption that corporate net investment is a simple function
of undistributed profits after tax* Certainly, the relationship
between disposable income and spending is muoh less predictable
in the corporate than in the personal seotor* In depression,
particularly, a higher proportion of profits retained as a result
of lower taxes may not neoessarily induce investment. Indeed,
unless oorporate liquidity is the governing faotor, the importance
of the movements in the tax base (profits) may well obscure the
behavioural effeots of adjustments through tax changes*
Moreover, the analysis abstracts from all non-fiscal
influences suoh as monetary changes and adjustments in private
spending which may result from changes in liquid asset holdings
arising out of a budget surplus or deficit* If changes in the
budget balanoe are reflected in changes in the money supply, the
automatic fiscal impaot may be considerably increased. If they are
reflooted in ohanges in the publio debt, the effect may be reduced.^1^
(124) See Milton Friedman, WA Monetary and Fiscal Framework for
Economic Stability", op* pit.
CHAPTER V
AH EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OP THE AUTOMATIC YIELD
FLEXIBILITY OF THE BRITISH INCOME TAX SYSTEM
AND OF ITS STABILIZING- EFFECT
"'Built-in stabilizers' have received less attention
in Britain than in the U.S.A But their
Jetentialities might veil be investigated furthern order to determine wheth r some extension or
strengthening would be desirable."
(Thomas Wilson, Inflation)
Chapter III consisted of an examination of the major flexible
devioes in the fiscal structure of the United Kingdom. In the
course of that discussion it emerged that direct taxes on personal
and oerporate income are likely to provide a large share of the
total built-in flexibility in the econoay. In Chapter IV a system
of relationships was formulated which provides a means of
evaluating built-in flexibility and its impact on economic
fluctuations. It is the purpose of the present chapter to give
statistically determined values to the necessary variables in order
to quantify empirically the built-in flexibility of the taxes on
income and profits. It will then be possible to make at least a
first approximation of the compensating effeot of this measured
flexibility.
The analysis begins by deriving the built-in flexibility of
taxes on personal inooaes (the measure a' in the preceding theoretical
disoussion). This is accomplished by examining the way in which
personal tax yields ohange in response to changes in the level of
personal income, assuming the relative distribution of personal
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Incomes remains constant. Similar3y, the marginal rate of
tax on changes in corporate savings is determined (giving the
measure mM).
In order that the effeots of these two flexibility components
on changes in aggregate income oan be examined, the expeoted
distribution of aggregate inoome ohanges between personal inooae
and oorporate savings is determined by a statistical examination
of historical data. This involves the construction of an
equation to give the values of the ooeffioient v for given ohanges
in aggregate inoome.
Changes in aggregate inoome above and below the level aotually
prevailing in 1959 are then postulated, representing depression
and inflation in varying degrees. The built-in flexibility of
direct tax yields is then predicted for each oase, using the values
for v, m* and m*' determined by eopirioal analysis. Using values
for the marginal propensity of the personal sector to oonsume, o,
and of firms to invest, 1, the stabilizing effeot of tax flexibility
is estimated.
1. Built-in Flexibility: A. Taxes on Personal Inoome
The sensitivity of taxes on personal inoome (inoome tax, plus
surtax) to ohanges in the level of personal inoome was determined
in the following manner. Personal inoome (Yp) was defined as
the total of personal Income allocable by income ranges. The 1959
level of personal inoome thus defined, and its distribution
among fifteen inoome brackets, is available in official statistics
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and provides the "base on whioh tax yield changes can be calculated.^
In order to establish the way in which the marginal effective
rate of tax (or m') varies in response to the level of personal
inoome, five other levels of personal income, two below and three
above the 1959 level, were postulated. These "alternative" levels
of personal inoome were then distributed over the fifteen inoome
ranges maintaining the same relative distribution of incomes as
prevailed in 1959* The 1959 effeotive tax rate on each inoome
bracket was then applied to the corresponding brackets throughout,
giving the total tax payable, for each level of personal inoome, at
1959 effeotive rates/126^
(125) National Inoome and Expenditure I960. Table 22. Inoome
allocable by income ^aokets* exoludes some forms of inoome
which enter into the figures for total inoome of the personal
seotor (ibid. Table 2), suoh as investment inoome of non¬
profit making bodies and of life insurance and super¬
annuation funds; employers' contributions to national
insurance and pension schemes; ary parts of employees'
inoome including national insurance contributions that are
deduotable for inoome tax purposes; most income in kind;
accrued interest on National Savings Certificates; dividends
on oo-eperative sooieties; some grants to persons from
public authorities; the excess of imputed inoome from
owner-occupied dwellings over Sohedule A valuations;
depreciation allowances deduoted from the trading and
professional incomes of persons; any other differences
between the incomes shown in the Inland Revenue returns and
the corresponding estimates included in personal inoome;
certain non-taxable grants from public authorities;
post-war oredits; and incomes of persons reoeiving less
than £50 a year. On the other hand, certain pensions
derived from private superannuation schemes are included,
although excluded from the total of personal incomes. For
a more detailed, outline of the differences between these
figures, see Ibid, pp. 68-69, and Sourpes and Methods, pp.
69-70. Inoome classifiable by inoome ranges represented
83.4 per oent of total Inoome of the personal seotor in
1959.
(126) The procedure followed in this calculation is outlined in
Appendix I.
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From the figures of total personal inoome and total tax payable,
the effective (average) rates of tax on personal inoome were
oaloulated for the five alternative income levels and for 1959.
The ratio of the differenoe between the level of personal income
for 1959 and that of each alternative, and the corresponding
differenoe in tax yields, gave the marginal rate of tax for each
postulated income change. These average and marginal rates of tax
are plotted on a scale of income in Figure 2 to show their trend
over the range of inoom© being considered. A least-squares regression
line was oaloulated and plotted through the series of marginal rates
in order to eliminate the random variations from the trend resulting
from the difficulty of reading large numbers on a logarithmic scale.
(127) I.e. Appendix I, Chart A.
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The linear regression of built-in flexibility m* (or the
marginal rate of tax expressed as a fraction) on the level of personal
income, Yp, gives an equation
m' = .0113 Yp 19
where personal income is expressed in millards of pounds.v
This method of assessing the built-in flexibility of personal
(129)
income tax yield involves a number of assumptions. ' Perhaps
(128) The square of the coefficient of correlation (r2) is very hight
.918. Its divergence from unity can be expected to arise
from errors in reading figures from the cumulative income
distribution chart. The regression calculation produces a
constant parameter of .0007, but since Yp is expressed here in
thousand millions, the constant is negligible. Over very
vd.de changes in Yp the relationship is unlikely to be a
straight line and, since tax yields become positive only when
some incomes exceed the exemption limit, the intercept must be
negative. In any event, the determination of the intercept
involved an extrapolation which ©an hardly be considered
reliable in view of the range of values calculated.
(129) Most other assessments of the magnitude of personal income tax
yield flexibility, such as these of Peohmsn, Cohen and Clement,
op. cit., have consisted of an analysis of aotual changes in tax
yields associated with actual changes in personal income over an
historical period, with due corrections for spy changes made to
the tax code during the period. All these analyses have dealt
with the federal tax structure in the United States. Quite
apart from the greater availability of relevant American figures
and statistics, the distaste for discretionary changes in the
United States has left the tax structure comparatively constant,
which facilitates an examination through time of the extent to
which the tax qystem responds to income changes. In Britain,
audi more significant changes have been made to the tax schedule
in recent years. Further complications present themselves in
connection with the application of a single income tax on both
personal and corporate incomes which in turn is complicated ty
frequently-changed special depreciation allowances. Any attempt
to correct personal income tax yields over a period of years to
what they would have been had the tax code remained fixed is
therefore open to considerable error. In addition, there lias
been substantial change in the pattern of taxable income distri¬
bution over the years. For present purposes, it was considered
(cent*a p. 124)
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the most contestable is that oonoerning the constancy of the pattern
of income distribution* Although this problem has been oonsidered
by a number of investigators, the pattern of ohange in inoome
distribution during eoonomio fluctuations has not been oonolusively
proven. During a depression the reoeipts of high inoooe groups
may be expected to fall more than the average beoause of their
heavy dependenoe on profits. On the other hand, the total inoome
from wages, which is oonoentrated in the lower income braokets, oan
be expeoted to fall off beoause of unemployment* There are, of
oourse, a large number of other considerations regarding possible
struotural changes during eoonomio fluctuations, such as rigidities
in wages and salaries, changes in the number of income reoeivers,
and the offsetting effect of unemployment benefits. Conflicting
empirical evidence arises from differenoes in the form of basio data
employed/130^
Secondly, beoauso the statutory inorements of tax progression
vary with individual oiroumstanoes, and ooinoide only randomly with
the fifteen inoome braokets used in this analysis, the application
of 1959 effeotive rates for eaoh inoome bracket subsumes a oonstant
average inoome within eaoh inoome bracket. Clearly, the error
(129) (cont'd)
preferable to isolate the magnitude of built-in flexibility
of the tax system from the influence of gradual inoome
redistribution over time. The present analysis, therefore,
aims at an estimate of the sensitivity of taxes on personal
inoomes at tho rates and allowaaoes applicable in 1 959
(the latest year for whioh statistics are available) in
order to show its reaction to short term inoome fluctuations
assuming that no inoome redistribution takes plaoe.
(130) See H. Mendershausen, Changes in Inoome Distribution During
the great Depression. N.B.E.R., Studies in Inoome and Wealth,
Vol. 7, New York, 1946} and Thomas Wilson, Inflation. Basil
Blaokwoll, Oxford, 1961, especially Chapter IV.
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arising out of this simplification depends upon the size of the
inoome increments of the braokots. Significantly, the size of the
brackets used in this analysis is largest toward the upper end of
the inoome soale where tax rates are highest and henoe the error
in the oaloulated tax paid is greatest* On the other hand, the
amount of Income involved (and to a lesser extent the tax payable)
tapers off toward the top brackets so that the total error involved
is not as great as it would otherwise be*
Finally, since earned and unearned inoome is taxed at different
rates, the proportion of unearned inoorae, and its distribution
over the income range, is assumed to remain unchanged* The number
of dependents, and other oircumstanoes whioh affect taxpayers'
inoome, and their distribution through the income range, is also
assumed to remain constant* The personal circumstances of taxpayers
are obviously fairly fixed in the short period. The acceptability
of this assumption therefore depends upon the time period involved,
whioh for present purposes oan almost certainly be considered short
enough to justify the postulation of fixed family and other personal
circumstances. The constancy in the proportion of unearned inoome
is more questionable. Unearned income whioh depends directly on
profits may be expeoted to fluctuate widely, but these fluctuations
will tend to be offset by the more stable receipts from fixed
interest, rents, and other annuities. In the short run, the
distribution of unearned inoome over the income range may reasonably
be expeoted to remain unchanged, though this conclusion in turn
would be strictly valid only if there were a constant proportionality"
between 'stable' and 'unstable' unearned income throughout the range
of unearned Inoome receivers.
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2. Built-in Flexibility! B. Taxes on Corporate Inoome
The built-in flexibility of the taxes on oorporate inoome
oan be determined more readily and with at least equal reliability.
The purpose is to estimate the way in which ohanges in oorporate
inoome influenoe the yield of profits tax plus inoome tax on
oorporate profits exoluding that part of inoome tax falling on
distributed profits (whioh is credited to personal inoome tax
payments).
The 1959-60 level of profits tax was fixed at 10 per oent
for all profits, whether distributed or undistributed, and was not
deduotablo for inoome tax purposes. The standard rate of inoome
tax, which is also payable by oorporate bodies on undistributed
profits, was seven shillings and nine penoe in the pound, or
58*75 per oent. The Inland Revenue reports show that over the
past nine years, at least, the proportion of taxable profits whioh
were not distributed has remained remarkably olose to an average
of 74*6 per oent.^1"^ Therefore, assuming this share of
undistributed profits is constant, and combining profits tax and
inoome tax liabilities, oorporate bodies bear the equivalent of a
(131) Between the years 1949-50 and 1957-58 inolusive the varia¬
tion from this average was plus 2*4 per oent (to 77*0 per
oent in 1951-52) to minus 1*8 per oent (to 72.8 per cent in
1957-58). These figures were calculated from the 97th.
102nd and 103rd Inland Revenue Reports. Tables 78, 77 and 81
respectively, whioh refer to the profits tax oharges against
distributed and undistributed profits. Although some
exemptions are allowable against profits for profits tax
purposes and taxable profits are not identioal with commercial
profits, these qualifications affeot only the total amount of
profits and do not alter the proportion between distributed
and undistributed profits.
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proportional tax on undistributed profits of 52*15 per oent.^^
Sinoe the tax oan be considered proportional, the marginal
rate is equal to the effeotive average rate, and the built-in
flexibility measure (whioh is the marginal rate expressed as a
fraction) is therefore constant* Thus
ffl* ■ 0.5215 20
Again, important assumptions are implicit in this conclusion.
firstly, it is assumed that retained corporate income bears the
burden of all taxes on profits exoept that part of income tax
whioh is attributable to distributions. The theory of tax
inoidenoe suggests that this is far too simple a conclusions sinoe
it ignores not only the involved problems of tax shifting but also
the nay in which distributions are influenced by taxation. This
latter consideration takes on particular Importance in view of
the possibility of differences in the rate of tax on distributed
profits provided for under the system of rebates payable to
reoeivers of dividends whose marginal statutory liability is less
than the standard rate. furthermore, the allocation of the full
weight of profits tax to undistributed profits oversimplifies the
real situation sinoe this tax direotly influences the amount of
disposable profits and henoo also the volume of distributions.
Nevertheless, the importance of these qualifications is reduoed as
(132) I.e. 38.75 per oent inoom© tax plus 10 per cent profits tax
en all profits (or 13*40 per oent on the undistributed
portion). It should be noted that in praotioe the
oaloulation of corporate income for income tax and profits
tax is not exactly identical, and certain abatements apply
on small inoomes in the case of profits tax. These
differences are not aocounted for here but it is doubtful
if they would appreciably affeot the total result.
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long as the analysis is oonoerned with a fixed rate of proportional
tax liability, so that changes in tax yield arise from ohanges in
the amount of income rather than ohanges in the effective rate of
the tax (i.e. substitution effects are less oomplioated) and as
long as the immediate oonoem is not with incidenoe but merely with
changes in tax yield.
The assumption regarding the constancy in the proportion of
profits distributed also requires some qualification. Although
the experience of the last decade justifies this simplification it
does not necessarily follow that such constant proportionality will
hold during future economic fluctuations. The last ten years were
marked by considerable swings in the level of oorporate profits but
they oontained no examples of either sharp depression or severe
inflation. Moreover, a constant proportionality between distributed
and retained profits conflicts with any tendency tor firms to
maintain dividend distributions through periods of fluctuating
profits. ^-*3) it is likely that the validity of this assumption
is weakened the greater the fluctuations in inoome under consideration.
3* The Distribution of Changes in Aggregate Inoome Between the
Personal and Corporate Seotors
Before any estimate of the impact of tax yield flexibility oan
be attempted, it is neoessazy to asoertain the way in whioh aggregate
inoome fluctuations are to be apportioned between personal inoome
(133) However, there appears to be limited to this tendency. The
decline in taxable profits between 1957-58 and 1958-59 was
aoooapanied by an even greater fall in distributions. Ibid.
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and retained corporate profits. As the theoreiioal discussion in
the preceding chapter indicates, this distribution of income
changes has important implications for the stabilizing effeot of
tax yield changes as long as the marginal rate of tax or the
propensity to spend differs between the personal and oorpor&te
sectors. The present purpose is therefore to determine the share
of aggregate inoome changes which are attributable to retained
corporate profits. This was referred to earlier as the ooeffioient
Toward this end, the actual figures for personal income,
corporate savings, and aggregate inoome - aooording to the definitions
used in this analysis-were calculated for eaoh year of the deoade
ending in 1959.^1^
The changes in corporate savings between eaoh. pair of years
was then plotted against the assooiated change in aggregate income
as shown in Figure 3* A calculation of a least-squares regression
line through these values suggests that changes in corporate savings,
(134) See Appendix II. The oaloulation of the share of
undistributed profits in aggregate inoome ohanges (i.e. the
ooeffioient v) serves not only to determine the amount of
personal Inoome (as a residual) but also to find the amount
on which corporate bodies pay tax. In theory no oonflict
arises between these two purposes. In practice, however,
the oaleulated undistributed profits do not reflec b exactly
the figure needed for the second purpose beoause of speoial
depreciation allowanoes for tax purposes which have ohanged
over the period. The depreciation figures used in Appendix
II are the National Inoome estimates of oapital consumption
for eaoh yearj whioh ©an be expeeted to approximate more
closely to the depreciation allowanoes that would have
obtained if the provisions had been held constant over the
period.
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, , are related to ohanges in aggregate inoome aY, according to
the equation^
^ = - 715.52 + .910 a Y
by definition, v =
so the above equation oan be recast in terms of v:
v 3 .910 - 21
a 1
This relationship bears interesting implications. It implies
that the change in undistributed profits will be negative unless
the inorease in aggregate inoome exceeds £736 millions.^For
ai\y increase less than this, a positive marginal tax rate (mM) on
retained profits means that corporate tax yields will fall. Thus,
when the inorease in aggregate inoome is small, oorporate tax yield
flexibility is destabilising.
On the other hand, personal income oontinues to inorease through
depression (defining depression as a deoline in aggregate inoome)
unless the fall in aggregate inoome reaches exceedingly high
proportions; namely, a fall of nearly £8000 millions.^
Therefore, as long as the marginal rate of tax on personal Inoome (m*)
is positive, for aiy fall in income less than this amount the yield
of personal inoome taxes will inorease. Henoe the tax is compensat¬
ing during a rise in aggregate Inoome but is destabilising during a
downswing, unless the fall in aggregate inoome is of very severe
proportions.
2
(135) The ooeffioient of correlation squared (r ) is .930.
(136) I.e., where » 0, aY = 786.1. This is 4*23 per oent of
the 1959 level of aggregate Inoome.
(137) More precisely, £7950 millions (i.e. aS^ = a Y where
aY a - 7950). This is 42.76 per oent of the 1959 level of
aggregate inoome.
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Figure 3 s The relationship between increases in retained profits
and inoreases in aggregate income
The Stabilising Impact of Inoome and Profits Tax Flexibility
This seotion is concerned with the extent to whioh the automatic
changes in direot tax yields examined above affeot fluctuations in
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aggregate inoome.^1^' The approaoh adopted oonsists in postulat¬
ing a variety of ohanges in aggregate income above and below the
actual 1959 level, representing different degrees of inflation
(increases in aggregate money income) and depression (decreases
in aggregate money income). These ohanges are allooated between
personal inoome and undistributed profits aooording to Equation 21.
Using values for the automatic tax flexibility coefficients a' and
a" provided by equations 19 and 20, and approximate values for the
marginal spending ooeffioients, the stabilizing effectiveness, Z,
is then oaloulated aooording to equations 9, 15 end 18.
It is assumed that spending behaviour in the personal seotor
is governed by personal Inoome after tax payments, and that all taxes
are paid on a pay-as-you-eam basis. For the corporate seotor tax
aooruals are assumed to be the governing determinant. These
assumptions, while being perhaps the most realistic simplifications,
eliminate the complications of time lags between aooruals and payments.
Since the analysis is based on a statio model, the time period
involved in adjustment is taken to be the length of time required
for the multiplier effeets of an income change to work themselves
out. In fact, there are likely to be differences in lags depending
upon the distribution of inoome ohanges and upon the direotion of the
(139)
fiscal change.v ' It is further assumed that no other ohanges
(138) Aggregate inoome continues to refer to the sum of personal
income as defined earlier (footnote 125) and undistributed
profits of oorporate bodies. It differs from total private
inoome to the extent that the income of publio corporations
is inoluded. It oonsists, therefore, of all income directly
liable to income taxes.
(139) See, for example, L.l. Klein, et al.. An Econometric Model of
the United Kingdom, Basil Blaokwell, Oxford, 1961.
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take place during the period involved.
Four changes in aggregate income around the aotual 1959 level
are considered, namely t
Case 1: mild reoeasion, marked by a five per oent fall
in aggregate income* Inoidentally, this compares
with the deoline of 6.1 per oent between 1951 and
1952, the only year during the last deoade that
aggregate income aotually fell (see Appendix II)
Case 2: depression, characterized by a fifteen per oent
fall in aggregate inoome
Case 3: mild inflation, marked by a five per oent rise in
aggregate inoome. This is slightly less than the
increase experienced between 1958 and 1959 (viz*
5«4 per oent)
Case 4s inflation, a fifteen per oent increase in
I
aggregate income• This oompares with the aotual
rise between 1950 and 1951 of 14.0 per oent.
Table 1 shows the aotual 1959 levels of aggregate inoome, Y,
undistributed oorporate profits, S^, and personal inoome , as
defined earlier. The four postulated ohanges in aggregate inoome
are also shown, apportioned between the oorporate and personal
seotors aooording to equation 21.
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TABLE 1
The distribution of postulated aggregate income changes
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* Figures from Appendix II
** Where Sb = Sb in 1959 ma!
*** Where Yp = Y - Sb
The lapaot of personal income tax flexibility
An estimate of the stabilizing affeot of built-in flexibility of
personal inoome tax yields requires a measure of the way personal
oonsumption is influenced by changes in personal inoome after tax.
For present purposes the marginal propensity to oonsume (o) for each
postulated ohange in inoome is derived from the equation
o = [.64a(Yp - Tp) + .36 Ct_ ] r a(Yp-Tp) 22
where a(Yp - Tp) a the ohange in personal income
net of tax
* Ct_, = thoohong. in oonsumption in the
previous perlod^1if0)
(140) This is a simplification of the equation for changes in the
expenditure of households developed by Riohard Stone and
D.A. Rowe, "Aggregate Consumption and Investment Funotions
for the Household Sector Considered in the Light of British




This gives a highly simplified marginal oonsuraption coefficient
and ignores many important factors, suoh as the distribution of
personal inoome ohanges and rates of adjustment. Nevertheless,
it may be considered a satisfactory approximation for present
purposes.
Table 2 shows the oaloulated stabilising impact of automatlo
personal inoome tax flexibility for eaoh of four postulated changes
in aggregate inoome. In & mild depression (Case 1), the increase
in personal inoome and a high marginal propensity to consume oause
the ohanges in personal tax yield to aggravate the fall in
aggregate inoome; the decline would have been 8.9 per cent less
had personal tax yields not increased. The smaller inorease in
personal inoome in the more pronounced depression (Case 2), more
than offsets the higher marginal propensity to oonsume and the
destabilising effeot is reduced to 3.4 per cent.
(140) (cont'd)
The equation used here is adapted from Stone and Rowe's
equation 69 (p. 24)* It is simplified here to the extent
that prioes are assumed 00x13tent and no distlnotion is
made between oonsumption and investment in consumer
durables.
Stone and Rowe's definition of personal disposable inoome
excludes inoome tax paid and national insurance contributions
but it Includes some items whioh do not enter into (Tp * Tp)
as defined above (see footnote 11). The ohanges in these
other items, however, are likely to be relatively small.
As the authors indicate, the funotion can be significantly
improved by subdividing inoome into two Inoome groups, and
the equation embodying this refinement is tested in their
artiole with very good results.
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Table 2
The stabilizing impaot of personal inoome tax
flexibility, Z (of a'), for eaoh postulated
change in aggregate inoome
m' ▼ 0 Z (of m«)
Case 1 .193 1.697 1.092 - .089
Case 2 .191 1.167 1.252 • .034
Case 3 .194 0.141 .999 .540
Case 4 .196 0.653 .937 «086
where m' » #0113 Yp (equation 19)
T-.910. 3*4 (equation 21)
o a j.64 a(Yp - Tp) + ,56 J t a(Yp-2^>) (equation 22)
Z (of a') « j . -1t)(i^'» mO (equation 9)
The most remarkable result is that obtained for Case 3, the
postulated mild Inflation mhioh is fairly typical of the increases
in aggregate inoome during the last deoade. Most of the increase
in aggregate inoome is attributable to personal inoome and the
resulting inorease in personal tax yields is sufficient to reduoe
the amplitude of the fluotuation to less than one half of what it
would otherwise be. Finally, in the inflation oase (Case if) the
inorease in undistributed profits is almost twioe that of personal
income, and the inorease in personal tax yield reduoed the potential
fluotuation by only 8.6 per oent.
The impaot of oorporate tax flexibility
At this point, the empirloal analysis becomes far sore speculative.
An estimate of the stabilizing effeot of corporate tax yield flexibility
137
is such more isspreoise since it is necessary to draw some simple
relationship between changes in undistributed profits after tax
and changes in investment spending. It is well known that there
is no clear-out relationship between these two variables, and that
there are other exogenous factors, such as business expectations,
which may be more important than corporate liquidity in influencing
investment, particularly during a depression. Nevertheless, for
want of a more re&listio yet necessarily simple coefficient, it is
assumed here that the marginal propensity for corporate bodies
to invest disposable retained profits is constant at alternatively
.2 and .4. These values are at best in the right order of
magnitude and at worst merely arbitrary numbers serving to complete
the illustration of the theoretioal relationships of Chapter ^
Table 3 shows the stabilising effect of corporate tax yield
flexibility calculated on the basis of those alternative values
for the investment coefficient.
(141) A calculation of the ratios of the annual increases in net
corporate investment to the changes in corporate savings
after tax for the decade 1950-1959 is little help in
establishing a reasonable estimate for the marginal
investment coefficient. Little more can be said than that
net investment and disposable profits tend, more often than
not, to move in the same direction. Incidentally, the
correlation is not obviously improved by making invest¬
ment a lagged funotion of retained profits.
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TABLE 3
The stabilizing impact of oorporate tax yield







Case 1 .5215 1.679 .209 • 516
Case 2 •5215 1.167 .137 .313
Case 3 •5215 0.141 .015 .031
Case 4 .5215 0.653 .073 .156
where a* « *5215 (equation 20)
▼ as .910 • (equation 21)
Z (of n") a ■ j (equation 15)
The effect of yield flexibility in undistributed profits tax
examined in isolation contrasts sharply with Table 2 because the
flexibility parameter is oonstant at a much higher level, the swings
in income are relatively greater, and the spending coefficients are
much smaller.
In the recession oase oorporate tax flexibility prevents a
substantial proportion of the potential fall in aggregate income
beoause the muoh sharper fall in retained profits results in a
marked reduction in oorporate tax yields. This offset is reduced
in the more pronounoed depression oase since the fall in undistributed
profits is smaller in relation to the deoline in aggregate income.
In a stronger inflation the compensating effeot is inoreased sinoe a
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larger share of the total change is attributable to undistributed
profits. In all oases, the ohange in corporate tax yields is in
a compensating direction, (though equation 21 shows that it would
be destabilizing for deolines of less than 4*23 per cent).^1^
The impaot of personal and corporate tax flexibility combined
The effeots of yield flexibility of the taxes on the two
sectors hare been shown separately not only to illustrate their
differenoes in impaot but also because the estimate for the
corporate seotor is much less reliable than that for the personal
seotor. The total iapaot of direot tax yield flexibility in both
sectors, Z (of a' and a"), oaloulated using the coefficients given
in Tables 2 and 3> is shown in Table 4*
?ablb 4
Combined impact of personal and oorporate
inoome tax yield flexibility





Case 1 .023 .163
Case 2 .078 .215
Case 3 •615 .697
Case 4 .195 .326
where Z (of a* + a") « 1 . 0 ^ ^ (i - (equation 18)
(142) See footnote 136, p. 130.
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Combining the assumptions made for both the personal and
corporate seotors, the over-all swings in tax yields are compensating
in every oase. With a small investment ooeffioient the effeot
during a decline is small, but a larger ooeffioient leads to a
substantial compensating impact. In the oase of an inorease in
aggregate income of five per eent the fluctuation would be roughly
three times as great had tax yields been inflexible. This is due
substantially to changes in the yield of taxes on the personal
seetor. In a sharper inflation the offset is reduoed because a
larger share of the total inoome inorease goes to the corporate
sector which has a lower propensity to spend.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY OP RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
"It would be far better that the eoonooist
should take a sardonlo pleasure in shocking
the practical man by the brutal frankness
with whioh he sets out his assumptions -
oonsoling himself for the disgust that this
oonduot will inspire by his own ocnviotion
•••• that he is approaohing the problem
that has been set to him by the only
route along whioh there is even a ohanoe of
finding the answer."
(Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition)
The theory and calculations of the last two chapters must be
interpreted with care* In this final ohapter a summary of the
results of Chapter V will be followed by some general concluding
remarks on the limitations of the method adopted.
The built-in flexibility of personal income tax yield has
been ealoulated in terms of the ratio of the money ehange in tax
receipts associated with a money change in the level of personal
income. Sinoe this in fact reflects the marginal rate of tax on
personal income, and given the progressive personal tax struoture,
the built-in flexibility of this tax has been found to increase as
the level of personal income increases. The yield flexibility of
taxes on retained corporate profits has been similarly evaluated
and shown to be a constant proportion of the tax base (i.e.
undistributed profits).
Using oalculated values for the consumption coefficient and a
derived relationship to give the division of aggregate income changes
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between the personal and corporate sectors, the stabilizing impaot
of flexibility in the yield of personal inoome taxes (at 1959 rates)
has been empirically determined with a fair degree of preoision. It
emerges that these taxes are slightly destabilizing during a
depression (except in an extreme decline) sinoe personal inoome and
henoe tax yields tend to continue to rise during a fall in aggregate
inoome* In the ease of sharp inflation their stabilizing effect
is limited because a relatively small share of the aggregate inoome
increase is attributable to the personal sector. However, in a mild
inflation, not untypical of the increases in income experienced
during the last deoade, the rise in aggregate Inoome might be more
than twice as great in the absenoe of personal tax yield flexibility.
A much less precise calculation has been made of the stabilizing
effect of corporate tax sensitivity, using alternative coefficients
for the tendency for oorporate bodies to invest undistributed profits.
The impact is greatest during a decline, when the fall in retained
profits exoeeds the decline in aggregate inoome.
Combining the impact of both personal and oorporate tax yield
flexibility, the stabilizing effeot in depression is small unless
firms have a high propensity to invest retained profits. In the
ease of a small rise in aggregate incomes, however, roughly two-
thirds of the potential fluctuation is stabilized. For sharper
increases in inoome the compensatory effeot is reduoed beoause a
relatively larger share of the aggregate increase is attributable
to the oorporate seotor which is likely to show a lower marginal
propensity to spend, and beoause the consumption ooeffieient of
the personal seotor declines with greater increases in inoome.
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As is the oaso with most such analyses, the method incorporates
a considerable number of simplifying assuctions, most of which
were outlined in the course of the discussion. The dependability
of the results therefore depends upon the tenabllity of the
assumptions; and although in each oase the assumption made was
oho3en as the most realistic or reasonable simplification, there are
nevertheless other possibilities that oould have been adopted.
Indeed, the entire oonoeptual framework oould have been formulated
in a different way. Built-in flexibility, for example, might have
been expressed, as other authors have suggested, as the degree to
whioh a given device contributes to a divergence from a oonstant
proportionality between government revenue and national inoome.
Suoh alternatives would alter the oonoeptual formulation of the
problem but they would not neoessarily affect the precision of the
results.
There are other assumptions, however, which do affect the
empirical measurements, and of particular importance are those in
oonneotion with the spending coefficients. Sinoe it has not been
the object of this analysis to quantify propensities, the most
satisfactory consumption relationaliip available was borrowed from
other investigators; but this in turn incorporated a good measure
of simplification. More seriously, the method requires a
coefficient whloh reflects the propensity of firms to invest. The
laok of any reliable investment ooeffioient is the most unfortunate
shortcoming of the whole analysis, but one which is consnon with
investigations of this sort. This difficulty has been dealt with,
albeit inadequately, by adopting two more or less arbitrary values
for the investment ooeffioient.
Primarily beoause of this problem, the results of Chapter
V are on two distinct levels of reliability. The measure of built-
in flexibility of personal inoome tax reoeipts oan be oonsidered
fairly precise and its impact on consumption spending (involving
the introduction of the consumption coefficient) slightly less so.
Similarly, the derivation of corporate tax yield flexibility is too
simple to leave room for serious error. In addition, the apportion¬
ment of aggregate inoome ohanges between the two sectors is supported
ty a high statistical correlation.
The serious imprecision arises in relating ohanges in dispos¬
able oerporate inoome to oorporate spending. Thus the impact of
corporate tax flexibility on eoonomic flexibility oaraiot be
oonsidered reliable. Por this reason, foroes operating through
the two seotors have been presented separately.
The empirioal analysis has been restricted to the effeots work¬
ing through the taxes on inoome and profits only. It mist be
remembered that this represents only a part - though probably the
largest part - of the whole gamut of sutomatio fiscal stabilizers
outlined in Chapter III.
The flexibility of infiireot taxes and transfers, and their
regulatory effect oould be examined and quantified using the same
tools ks have been employed in this analysis. This would comprise
a logioal extension of the present investigation. However, indirsot
taxes, particularly, present a somewhat different problem Insofar
as more tenuous assumptions are required regarding their incidence,
their effeots on demand, and on spending behaviour in general. A
study of these other devioes oould, and no doubt should, be mad©
in order to arrive at a oomplete estimate of the impact of automatio
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stabilizers. Th® discussion in Chapter III suggests that indirect
taxes and transfers will clearly strengthen the total automatic
stabilising effeot.
A further logioal refinement of the analysis, whioh has been
ignored on the contention that the results are instructive in the
short term only, would be to incorporate a provision for ohanges
in real output during the period under study. To the extent that
the national produot in real terms inoreases over the period, for
example, the extent of inflationary pressure is overstated and
depression understated in terms of the statio model employed above.
If automatic stabilizers were to be examined for their effeots
over long periods, then they would elearly have to be studied in
the context of a growth model, such as of the Harrod-Domar type,
which permits an examination of fluctuations around a ohanging
equilibrium level of inoome.
Nor does the analysis concern itself with extra-fisoal foroes
working through monetary ohanges or ohanges in liquid holdings
resulting from budget imbalances. In faot, as pointed out earlier,
soma of these pressures are likely to produoe a destabilizing
influence.
Finally, it is impossible to oonsider quantitatively the effeot
of built-in stability on expectations, liquidity, and investment
deoisions. Insofar as this is favourable, as may be expected,
the contribution of automatio stabilizers to counter-cyclical policy
is further strengthened.
However, the results obtained accomplish the purpose of the
study, whioh was to disoover the pattern in whioh particular flexible
devioes tend to react in different oiroumstanoes and to provide a
- 1if6 »
means of finding the approximate magnitude of their impaot on
eoonomio fluctuations. But regardless of their impaot, automatic
stabilisers cannot be expected to oorreot the oause of fluctuations*
Since they are in faot activated, only by the emergenoe of a
particular trend, automatic reaotions can only reduoe the size of
the multiplier, and even if the multiplier was reduoed to unity,
the primary oause of the movement would remain.
Insofar as automatio controls oan be depended upon, the
neoessity of relying en forecasting is avoided. If neither
forecasting nor automatio controls are adequate it is neoessary
to devise methods of aoting promptly after the fluctuation has
occurred. But built-in devioes reduoe the size of the problem
with which other measures must deal, and henoe their impaot is a




CALCULATION OF THE MAR&INAL AND AVERAGE TAX RATES
ON VARIOUS LEVELS OF PERSONAL INCOME
The procedure adopted in oaloulating the marginal and average
rates of tax for various levels of total personal income, given the
1959 effeotive rate struoture, was as follows. The offioial
figures for the distribution of personal incomes for 1959 provided
the data for plotting the cumulative peroentage of total personal
inoome against a logarithaio scale of personal inoome levels
(Chart I-A). This shows the cumulative distribution of personal
inoome over the inoome scale for 1959*
For each of the five alternative levels of personal income,
the upper limit of each 1959 inoome bracket was "adjusted" by
multiplying it by the ratio of total personal income in 1959 to
that of the alternative in question. This gave values for the upper
limit of each inoome bracket for each alternative in a consistent
position relative to total Inoome. Using these "adjusted" upper
limits of each inoome braoket, the cumulative peroentage of inoome
by braokets for each alternative were read off the distribution
ourve for 1959* The deoumulated peroentage applied to the total
personal income of each alternative then gave the distributions
of inoome aocording to the pattern prevailing in 1959 (i.e.
consistent with the 1959 Lorens ourve of inoome distribution). This
process of distribution and the final distribution for saoh
alternative appear in Table I-a.
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LEVEL OP PERSONAL INCOME
CHART I-A
CURVE OP CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE PERSONAL INCOME
DISTRIBUTION FOR 1959*
* Basio data from National Inoome and Expenditure 1960. Table 22.
aas i --a
nAT.GllT.dTTn^ CF THE DISTRIBUTION OF ALTERNATIVE LEVELS (ff PERSONAL INCOME ACCORDING TO THE
■PATTERN OF DISTRIBUTION PREVAILING IN 1959
INCOME
RANGE







$ Xp Xp X? Cum. $
Xp
$ Xp Xp X? Cum. $Xp $ Xp Xp
X? Cum. %
Xp
$ IF Xp X? Cum. ?
Yp
$ n Xp X? Cum. %Yp 1 $ ye Yp
50- 250 250 6.94 6.94 1140 260.3 7.50 7.50 1182.3 283,8 8.75 8.75 1265.5 240.5 6.40 6.40 1092.2 223.4 6.00 6.00 1102.0 2(3(2.0 4.70 4.70 955.0
250- 300 300 9.75 2,81 461 312.4 10.45 2.95 465.0 340.5 12.00 3.25 470.5 288.6 9,00 2.60 443.7 268.1 8.00 2.00 367.3 242.3 6.50 1.80 365.8
300- 400 400 15.93 6.18 1014 416.5 17.25 6*80 1072.0 454.0 19.60 7.60 1099.2 384.7 14.80 5.80 989.8 357.5 13.00 5.00 918.4 323.1 11.20 4.70 955.0
400- 500 500 23.71 7.78 1277 520.7 25.75 8.50 1339.9 567.5 30.20 10.60 1533.1 480.9 22.00 7.20 1228.8 446.9 19225 6.25 1147.9 403.9 16.25 5.05 1026.2
500- 600 600 33.71 10230 1641 624.8 36.20 10.45 1647.3 681.0 42275 12*55 1815.1 577.1 30.75 8*75 3493.3 536.2 27.00 7.75 1423.4 484.7 22.25 6.00 1219.2
600- 700 700 45212 11.42 1874 728.9 47-75 11.55 1820.7 794.5 55*75 13*00 1880.2 673.3 41225 10*50 1791.9 625.6 35.80 :... 0 1616,3 565.5 30.00 7.75 1574.8
700- 800 800 56.60 11.43 1884 833.0 60.50 12.75 2009.9 908.0 67.25 11.50 1663.2 769.5 53*00 11.75 2005.3 715.0 46.60 10.80 1983.6 646.3 38.45 8.45 1717.0
800- 1GQ0 1000 73.27 16.67 2737 1041.3 74.80 14.30 2254.3 1135.0 78.50 11.25 1627.1 961.9 70*80 17.80 3037.7 893.7 66.20 19.60 3599.9 807.8 58.00 19.55 3972.6
1000- 1500 1500 85.05 11.78 1933 1562.0 85.75 10.95 1726.2 1702.5 86.75 8.25 119322 1442.8 84225 13.45 2295.4 1340.6 82.80 16.60 3048.9 1211,7 80.25 22.25 4521.2
1500- 2000 2000 88.94 3.89 639 2082.6 89.40 3.65 575.4 2270.0 90.20 3.45 499*0 1923.7 88*40 4.15 708.3 1787.4 87.20 4.40 808.2 1615.6 86.00 5.75 1168.4
2000- 5000 3000 92.51 3.57 586 3123.9 92.80 3.40 536.0 3405.0 93.50 3*30 477*3 2885.6 92*25 3.85 657.0 2681.2 91.60 4.40 808.2 2423.5 90.80 4.80 975.4
3000- 5000 5000 95.80 3.28 539 5206.5 96.00 3.20 504.5 5675.0 96.60 3*10 448*4 4809*3 95.60 3.35 571.7 4468.6 95.20 3.60 661.2 4039.1 94.60 3.80 772.1
5000-10000 10000 98.29 2.49 409 10413.0 98.40 2.40 378.3 11350.0 98.50 1*90 274*8 9618*5 98.25 2.65 452.2 S937.2 98.00 2.80 514.5 8078.2 97.75 3.15 640.1
10000-20000 20000 99*43 1.14 187 20826.0 99.45 1.05
?
165.5 22700.0 99.60 1*10 159*1 19237.0 99.40 1.15 196.3 17874.4 99.20 1220 220.4 16156.4 99.15 1.40 284.5
20000 + 100.00 .57 94 100.00 .55 86,7 100.00 .40 57*8 100.00 .60 102.4 100.00 .80 147.0 100.00 .85 172.7
TOTAL Yp = 16,415 TOTAL Yp = 15,764 TOTAL Yp = 14,463 TOTAL Yp a 17,066 TOTAL Xp == 18,367 TOTAL Yp = 20,32C
(1) Actual distribution for 1959; front National Income and Expenditure K60. Table 22.
(2) I.e. a decrease in personal income of £651 million, or 3.966% of the 1959 level.
(3) I.e. a decrease in personal income of £1,952 million, or 11.892$ of the 1959 level.
(4) I.e. an increase in personal income of £651 million, or 3.966$ of the 1959 level.
(5) I.e. an increase in personal income of £1,952 million, or 11.892$ of the 1959 level.
(6) I.e. an increase in personal income of £3,905 million, or 23.789$ of the 1959 level.
(7) Where X equals the adjusted position of the upper limit of the income bracket on Chart I-A, obtained by multiplying
it by the ratio of total 1959 personal income to that of the alternative in question.
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The effective tax rate on eaoh inoome braoket in 1959 was
calculated from the inoome falling in eaoh inoome range and the
tax payable thereon.* These rates were then applied to the
appropriate braokets for eaoh of the five postulated alternatives
(Table I-b). The total of Athe taxes payable by braokets represent
the total tax on personal inoome that would be payable on eaoh
alternative if the 1959 tax rates remained oonstant.
The average rate of tax for eaoh alternative level of inoome
was oaloulated by dividing the total tax payable by the level of
inoome. The marginal rates were derived as the ratio of the
ohange in tax from the 1959 level to the corresponding change
in personal inoome.
* The first column in Table I-b shows the rates of tax payable on
eaoh inoome range, oaloulated from the inoome and tax figures
appearing in the second and third oolumns respectively. These
latter figures were taken direotly from National Inoome and
Expenditure 1960. Table 22.
AVERAGE RATES 0? TAX ON THE AMEEKAME CHANGES IK PERSONAL INCOME AROOTO THE 1?g?
LEVEL AT 1959 gFECIIVE RATES BY INCOME BRACKETS
Income and tax figures in £ million
1959 Income Distributions and 1959 Effective Tax Rate for Each Income Bracket Applied Throughout
XtfCOXB
RANGE
Effective 1959 Alternative I Alternative n Alternative III Alternative IV Alternative V
Tax Xfttt*
Yp Tp Yp Tp Yp Tp TP Tp Yp Tp Yp Tp
50- 250 .175 1140 2 1182.3 2.1 1265.5 2.2 1092.2 1.9 1102.0 1.9 955.0 1.7
250- 300 1.302 461 6 465.0 6.1 470.0 6.1 443.7 5.8 367.3 4.8 365.8 4.8
300- 400 3.452 1014 35 1072.0 37.0 1099.2 37.9 989.8 34.2 918.4 31.7 955.0 33.0
400- 500 4.933 1277 63 1339.9 66.1 1533.1 75.6 1 228.8 60.6 1147.9 56.6 1026.2 50.6
500- 600 5.667 1641 93 1647.3 93.4 1815.1 102.9 x1 493.3 84.6 1423.4 80.7 1219.2 69.1
600- 700 6.137 1874 115 1820.7 111.7 1880.2 115.4 1 791.9 110.0 1616.3 99.2 1574.8 96.6
700- 800 6.900 1884 130 2009.9 138.7 1663.2 114.8 4>005.3 138.4 1983.6 136.9 1717.0 118.5
800- 1000 7.600 2737 208 2254.3 171.3 1627.1 123.6 3037.7 230.9 3599.9 273.6 3972.6 301.9
1000- 1500 10.709 1933 207 1726.2 184.9 1193.2 127.8 2295.4 245.8 3048.9 326.5 4521.2 484.2
1500- 2000 18.466 639 118 575.4 106.3 499.0 92.1 708.3 130.8 808.2 149.2 1168.4 215.8
2000- 3000 25.763 586 151 536.0 138.1 477.3 123.0 657.0 169.3 808.2 208.3 975.4 251.3
3000- 5000 33.581 539 181 504.5 169.4 448.4 150.6 571.7 192.0 661.2 222.0 772.1 259.3
5000-10000 45.477 409 186 378.3 172.0 274.8 125.0 452.2 205.6 514.3 233.9 640.1 291.1
10000-20000 60.963 187 114 165.5 100.2 159.1 97.0 196.3 119.7 220.4 134.4 184.5 173.4
20000+ 75.532 94 71 86.7 65.5 57.8 43.7 102.4 77.3 147.0 111.0 172.7 130.4
Total personal
Income (Yp) 16,415 15,764 14,463 17,066 18,367 20,320
Total Tax
Payable (Tp) 1,680 1564.2 1337.2 1806.9 2070.7 2481.7
Average Tax late
<§> .102 .099 .093 .106 .113 .122
Postulated Change in
Personal Income (aYp) -651 -1952 651 1952 3905
Postulated Change in
Tax Payable (a Tp) -115.8 -342.3 126.9 390.7 801.7
Marginal Rate of Tax
xg <- ">
.1779 .1754 .1949 .2002 .2053
^Derived from income and. tax figures by ranges for 1959? National Income and Expenditure i960» Table 22.
APPENDIX II
CALCULATION OF AGGREGATE INCOME AND UNDISTRIBUTED CORPORATE PROFITS
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11,485 13,089 12,290 13,063 14,354- 15,821 16,805 17,526 17,641 18,593




















Undistributed corporate income including taxes on income but before providing for depreciation and stock appreciation}
calculated from National Income and Expenditure, 1960, Table 3°
2
Capital consumption of companies and public corporations} calculated from Ibid., Table 58.
^ Increase in value of stocks and work in progress of companies and public corporations} calculated from Ibid.. Table 60.
• Net corporate savings before tax, calculated from the above three items.
^ As defined in the text. For the years 1950, 1951 and 1952, consistent figures of allocable personal income were not
available. They were, therefore, calculated by dividing the national income figures of total personal income for those
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